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I. INTRODUCTION 
Like many laws impacting the rights of women in relation to reproduction, 
House Bill 214 (H.B. 214),1 Ohio’s “Down syndrome abortion ban,” raises 
profound personal, ethical, spiritual, and political questions2—questions that 
                                                                                                                     
 1 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2919.10, 2919.101, 3701.79 (West, Westlaw through File 
51 of 132d Gen. Assemb. (2017–2018)). The measure, which has already been challenged 
in federal court, see Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at para. 1, 
Preterm-Cleveland v. Himes, No. 1:18-cv-109 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 15, 2018); see also Preterm 
Cleveland, No. 1:18-cv-109 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 14, 2018) (order granting preliminary 
injunction), was at times referred to as “the Down Syndrome Non-Discrimination Act.” See, 
e.g., Hearing on H.R. 214 Before the H. Health Comm., 132d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 
(Ohio 2017–2018) (statement of Rep. Derek Merrin at 1) [hereinafter Merrin Testimony]. 
H.B. 214, H.R. 214 132d Gen. Assemb., Reg Sess. (Ohio 2017) (as passed by House, Nov. 
1, 2017), is identical to Senate Bill 164, S. 164, 132d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2017) 
(as passed by Senate, Nov. 15, 2017). Email from Amy Archer, Research Assoc., Ohio 
Legislative Serv. Comm., to Tara Marasco, Sr. Legislative Aide, Ohio Senate (Dec. 7, 2017) 
(on file with Ohio State Law Journal) (“Per your request, I am writing to confirm that SB 
164 (As Passed by the Senate) and HB 214 (As Passed by the House) are identical.”). 
 2 This expression echoes the spirit of similar remarks in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 
116 (1973):  
 We forthwith acknowledge our awareness of the sensitive and emotional nature of 
the abortion controversy, of the vigorous opposing views, even among physicians, and 
of the deep and seemingly absolute convictions that the subject inspires. One’s 
philosophy, one’s experiences, one’s exposure to the raw edges of human existence, 
one’s religious training, one’s attitudes toward life and family and their values, and the 
moral standards one establishes and seeks to observe, are all likely to influence and to 
color one’s thinking and conclusions about abortion. 
It also resonates with the observations of the authors of the joint opinion for the Court in 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992): 
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touch upon some of the most fundamental aspects of human existence and the 
human condition. These questions and their delicate nature deserve 
acknowledgement at the outset, both in themselves and as inquiries that deserve 
ventilation in the public sphere. What follows here, however, is something else. 
It is an engagement of an almost entirely different, though not wholly unrelated, 
sort: an effort that looks into how H.B. 214 conforms to the U.S. Constitution 
as that charter of government and civil and political rights now stands.3 
The conclusion about H.B. 214’s constitutionality, stated up front, amounts 
to this: H.B. 214 is inconsistent with the Federal Constitution’s present 
demands. Discussion explaining why is organized into four parts. First is a brief 
summary of key aspects of what H.B. 214 does. Second is a basic overview of 
the relevant constitutional rules against which H.B. 214 must be considered. 
Third is an analysis of H.B. 214’s constitutionality that considers both its 
previability and postviability applications. And fourth is a conclusion that 
summarizes the preceding analysis and ends with a note on a question of 
personal conscience that H.B. 214 raises. 
II. WHAT DOES H.B. 214 DO? 
Succinctly, H.B. 214 prohibits anyone from “purposely perform[ing] or 
induc[ing] or attempt[ing] to perform or induce an abortion on a pregnant 
woman if the person has knowledge that the pregnant woman is seeking the 
abortion, in whole or in part, because of any”4 one of three reasons: (1) “[a] test 
result indicating Down syndrome in”5 the fetus she carries, referred to in the bill 
as “an unborn child;”6 (2) because of “[a] prenatal diagnosis of Down syndrome 
                                                                                                                     
 Men and women of good conscience can disagree, and we suppose some always 
shall disagree, about the profound moral and spiritual implications of terminating a 
pregnancy, even in its earliest stage. Some of us as individuals find abortion offensive 
to our most basic principles of morality, but that cannot control our decision.  
 3 The analysis in these pages focuses specifically on the constitutionality of H.B. 214 
within the context of the U.S. Supreme Court’s abortion rights jurisprudence. It does not 
purport to exhaust the full range of constitutional arguments about the measure, some of 
them gestured to below, see, e.g., infra notes 21, 197, and others not. Additionally, although 
the analysis in these pages focuses specifically on H.B. 214, the arguments offered about it 
apply in various ways to other Down syndrome abortion bans in other jurisdictions. Some of 
its lessons, including its methods of analysis, are also applicable to other decisional abortion 
bans, as well as to nondecisional abortion bans operating in the postviability setting, on 
which, in particular, see the analysis found infra in Part IV.B. 
 4 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.10(B) (West, Westlaw through File 51 of 132d Gen. 
Assemb. (2017–2018)). 
 5 Id. § 2919.10(B)(1). 
 6 Id. § 2919.10(B)(1)–(3). The Ohio Revised Code defines “unborn child” as “an 
individual organism of the species homo sapiens from fertilization until live birth.” Id. 
§ 2919.16(L). 
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in”7 the fetus she carries; or (3) to quote the language of the bill, because of 
“[a]ny other reason [that the woman has or might have] to believe that an unborn 
child has Down syndrome.”8 Anyone who performs or induces, or attempts to 
perform or induce an abortion under these circumstances commits a 
fourth-degree felony,9 which carries a criminal penalty of six to eighteen months 
in prison and a fine of not more than $5,000.00.10 Although H.B. 214 expressly 
exempts individual pregnant women from the operation of its criminal liability 
rule,11 physicians who violate its terms are additionally subject to professional 
sanction by the State Medical Board, which is required to “revoke a physician’s 
license to practice medicine in this state”12 for any violation of H.B. 214’s terms. 
In addition to these criminal and professional sanctions, H.B. 214 expressly 
authorizes civil liability for physicians for the same underlying conduct. 
According to H.B. 214: 
Any physician who violates . . . [the prohibitions on Down-syndrome-
abortions contained in the measure] is liable in a civil action for compensatory 
and exemplary damages and reasonable attorney’s fees to any person, or the 
representative of the estate of any person, who sustains injury, death, or loss to 
person or property as the result of the performance or inducement or the 
attempted performance or inducement of the abortion.13  
Importantly, H.B. 214, beyond providing for economic liability, authorizes a 
court in an H.B. 214-related case to award “any injunctive or other equitable 
relief that the court considers appropriate.”14 The scope of these “injunctive or 
other equitable relief”15 powers, impossible to fully know in advance, is 
potentially sweeping.16 
                                                                                                                     
 7 Id. § 2919.10(B)(2). 
 8 Id. § 2919.10(B)(3). 
 9 Id. § 2919.10(C). 
 10 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.14(A)(4) (West, Westlaw through File 51 of 132d 
Gen. Assemb. (2017–2018)) (term); id. § 2929.18(A)(3)(d) (fine).  
 11 Id. § 2919.10(F).  
 12 Id. § 2919.10(D).  
 13 Id. § 2919.10(E). 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. 
 16 What might these powers under H.B. 214 mean, for example, for hospitals or other 
medical or surgical centers where abortions are provided? Do these powers effectively 
authorize courts to claim and exercise direct supervisory authority over intake and patient 
engagement procedures at a medical facility after an abortion in violation of H.B. 214 has 
been performed? A useful touchstone for approaching these questions is found in David J. 
Lanciotti & Robin C. Larner, Equity, in 41 OHIO JURISPRUDENCE 3D 445, 448 (2017) 
(discussing “the fundamental principles of equity, including the nature and extent of equity 
jurisdiction, the scope and extent of equitable relief, and legal remedies as a limitation or bar 
on equity jurisdiction and relief”), and especially id. § 28 (“penalties and forfeitures in law 
and equity”). The relevant language of equity in H.B. 214, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
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Nor is that all. Leaving aside some provisions that, while important, are not 
especially germane to the present analysis,17 H.B. 214 imposes certain reporting 
requirements on attending physicians.18 It demands, among other things, that an 
attending physician “shall indicate”19 in State-required reporting that she or he 
“does not have knowledge that the pregnant woman was seeking the abortion, 
in whole or in part”20 because of any of the prohibited reasons for doing so. 
Stepping back from the details of H.B. 214 and speaking generally, the 
regulatory terrain this law occupies is striking.21 In sponsor testimony on H.B. 
214 before the Ohio House Health Committee, Representative Derek Merrin 
referred to an earlier measure, House Bill 135 (H.B. 135),22 which H.B. 214 
“strengthened.”23 Unlike H.B. 135, which prohibited abortion sought “solely 
because of a test result indicating Down syndrome in [a fetus] or a prenatal 
diagnosis of Down syndrome in [a fetus],”24 H.B. 214 prohibits “purposely 
perform[ing] or induc[ing] or attempt[ing] to perform or induce an abortion”25 
                                                                                                                     
§ 2919.10(E) (“In any action under this division, the court also may award any injunctive or 
other equitable relief that the court considers appropriate.”), is also found in id. § 2919.20(G) 
(“In any action under this division, the court also may award any injunctive or other equitable 
relief that the court considers appropriate.”) and id. § 2919.17(H) (same). 
 17 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.10(G) (West, Westlaw through File 51 of 
132d Gen. Assemb. (2017–2018)) (“[T]he provisions of this section and sections 2919.11 to 
2919.193 of the Revised Code are severable as provided in section 1.50 of the Revised 
Code.”); id. § 2919.10(H) (“The general assembly may . . . intervene as a matter of right in 
any case in which the constitutionality of this section is challenged.”). 
 18 See id. § 2919.101(A). 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
 21 The bar H.B. 214 imposes on pregnant women’s abortion decisions may practically 
burden the reproductive choices in particular of older women who may wish to become 
pregnant but have a higher risk of pregnancy affected by Down syndrome, who may, as a 
result, feel constrained to forego pregnancy altogether in light of H.B. 214. That being the 
case, H.B. 214 may implicate not only the right to abortion, as discussed here, but also the 
related and more general right to procreate. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 
(1972) (“If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or 
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally 
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”). Thanks to my colleague 
Ruth Colker for spotlighting this point.  
 22 H.R. 135, 131st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2015) (as reported by the H. Cmty. 
& Family Advancement Comm., June 17, 2015). 
 23 Merrin Testimony, supra note 1, at 1 (“House Bill 135 has been strengthened from 
the last General Assembly.”); accord Hearing on H. 214 Before the H. Health Comm., 132d 
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2017–2018) (statement of Rep. Sarah LaTourette at 1) 
[hereinafter LaTourette H.R. 214 Testimony: H. Health Comm.] (“I introduced similar 
legislation last General Assembly, but believe the language included in this bill to be even 
stronger and want to thank my joint sponsor for encouraging the changes included . . . .”). 
 24 Ohio H.R. 135, sec. 1, § 2919.20(B). 
 25 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.10(B) (West, Westlaw through File 51 of 132d Gen. 
Assemb. (2017–2018)). 
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when the pregnant woman’s reasons for seeking the abortion have anything at 
all to do with the fact, expectation, or belief that the fetus she is carrying “has 
Down syndrome.”26 
No less striking is the regulatory terrain H.B. 214 does not claim. Almost 
remarkably, H.B. 214 contains no exception to its abortion prohibition or its 
other regulatory measures for circumstances in which a pregnant woman’s life 
or health is imperiled by her pregnancy.27 H.B. 214 thus blocks a pregnant 
woman from ending a pregnancy for the most burning reasons having to do with 
her own life or health if the fact, expectation, or belief that the fetus she is 
carrying “has Down syndrome”28 plays any role in her decision. Should any of 
the prohibited reasons have any bearing at all on a pregnant woman’s choice to 
terminate her pregnancy, it does not matter what other reasons she does or might 
have for wishing to end her pregnancy. A pregnant woman herself will suffer 
no direct criminal consequences for her choice, but the reasons H.B. 214 defines 
as illicit make her attending physician’s conduct unlawful, and subject to 
criminal, professional, and civil liability, if the physician knows of the reasons 
for her choice.29 A great deal—both for the pregnant woman and for her 
physician, and, of course, from a pro-life point of view, for her unborn child—
thus hinges on what the legal meaning of “knowledge,”30 as used in the 
legislation, is. 
                                                                                                                     
 26 The quoted language appears in id. § 2919.10(B)(3). For the supporting language 
associated with what the text describes as “fact, expectation, or belief,” see id. 
§ 2919.10(B)(1)–(3). 
 27 Hearing on H.R. 214 Before the H. Health Comm., 132d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 
(Ohio 2017–2018) (statement of Jaime Miracle, Deputy Dir., NARAL Pro-Choice Ohio at 
2) (“This bill has absolutely no protections for a doctor treating a woman in a life-threatening 
situation or a condition that threatens her long-term health.”). 
 28 See generally OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.10(B)(1)–(3) (West, Westlaw through 
File 51 of 132d Gen. Assemb. (2017–2018)). The quoted language is in id. § 2919.10(B)(3). 
 29 Id. § 2919.10(B)–(F). 
 30 Id. § 2919.10(B). With thanks to Jessie Hill for the cross-tabbing, the term is defined 
by id. § 2901.22(B):  
A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is aware that the 
person’s conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain 
nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when the person is aware that such 
circumstances probably exist. When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is 
an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person subjectively believes 
that there is a high probability of its existence and fails to make inquiry or acts with a 
conscious purpose to avoid learning the fact.  
Read in light of this provision, H.B. 214’s “knowledge” requirement is potentially very 
broad. It involves both actual knowledge and effective or constructive knowledge, at least in 
certain circumstances. Practically, the “knowledge” requirement might give rise to a felt 
sense, if not a legal obligation, that an attending physician must “make [an] inquiry” into a 
pregnant woman’s reasons for wishing to terminate a pregnancy through abortion. 
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III. A VERY BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE EXISTING CONSTITUTIONAL 
RULES TO BE USED TO ASSESS H.B. 214’S CONSTITUTIONALITY 
Before assessing H.B. 214’s constitutionality, a very brief description of 
some essential aspects of the existing constitutional rules governing women’s 
reproductive rights in the abortion setting is in order. 
Central to the substantive promise of liberty protected by the U.S. 
Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment is an autonomy-based right to which 
pregnant women are entitled, recognized consistently since Roe v. Wade was 
decided.31 This constitutional right provides broad protections to the decision 
that a pregnant woman makes whether to continue or end a pregnancy before it 
reaches term. In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,32 
the Supreme Court reaffirmed what it termed Roe’s “essential holding,”33 
including, perhaps most importantly, “the right of the woman to choose to have 
an abortion before viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the 
State.”34 In saying this, Casey accepted Roe’s conviction that fetal viability is a 
crucial point during pregnancy and that this aspect of fetal development properly 
serves as a significant dividing line for constitutional purposes.35 Before 
viability, Casey observed, the State’s long-recognized interests in regulating a 
pregnant woman’s abortion choice—interests in regulating medical standards 
and the medical profession,36 in seeking to protect and preserve the pregnant 
                                                                                                                     
 31 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153–54 (1973). 
 32 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).  
 33 Id. at 846, 869, 880; see also id. at 870, 871, 873 (plurality opinion). 
 34 Id. at 846 (majority opinion). 
 35 Roe, 410 U.S. at 163 (“With respect to the State’s important and legitimate interest 
in potential life, the ‘compelling’ point is at viability. This is so because the fetus then 
presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother’s womb.”). 
 36 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157 (2007) (noting the State’s “interest 
in protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession” (quoting Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731 (1997))); id. at 158 (discussing the State’s “legitimate 
interests in regulating the medical profession in order to promote respect for life, including 
life of the unborn”); Roe, 410 U.S. at 150 (“The State has a legitimate interest in seeing to it 
that abortion, like any other medical procedure, is performed under circumstances that insure 
maximum safety for the patient.”); id. at 154 (referring to the State’s “important 
interests . . . in maintaining medical standards”). 
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woman’s life and health,37 and in the (potential) life of the fetus38—“are not 
strong enough to support a prohibition of abortion or the imposition of a 
substantial obstacle to the woman’s effective right to elect the [abortion] 
procedure.”39 
                                                                                                                     
 37 See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 871 (plurality opinion) (“[T]he State has legitimate 
interests in the health of the woman . . . .”); id. at 882 (“Those [earlier abortion] 
decisions . . . recognize a substantial government interest justifying a requirement that a 
woman be apprised of the health risks of abortion and childbirth. It cannot be questioned that 
psychological well-being is a facet of health.” (citation omitted)); id. at 900 (concluding that 
the recordkeeping and reporting requirements of the statute relate to the State’s interest in 
health); Roe, 410 U.S. at 150 (“[T]he State retains a definite interest in protecting the 
woman’s own health and safety.”); id. at 154 (reiterating the State’s “important interests in 
safeguarding health”); id. at 162 (“[T]he State does have an important and legitimate interest 
in preserving and protecting the health of the pregnant woman . . . .”). 
 38 The Court has formulated this interest in various terms. See, e.g., Gonzales, 550 
U.S. at 145 (discussing it as the State’s “legitimate and substantial interest in preserving and 
promoting fetal life”); id. at 146 (referring to the “legitimate interest of the Government in 
protecting the life of the fetus”); id. at 158 (“[T]he State, from the inception of the pregnancy, 
maintains its own regulatory interest in protecting the life of the fetus that may become a 
child . . . .”); Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (“[T]he State has legitimate interests from the outset of 
the pregnancy in protecting . . . the life of the fetus that may become a child.”); id. at 853 
(referring to the State’s “legitimate interests in protecting prenatal life”); id. at 858 
(discussing the “state interest in fetal protection”); id. at 870 (plurality opinion) (mentioning 
the State’s “legitimate interest in promoting the life or potential life of the unborn”); id. at 
871 (noting the same, but with the State’s “legitimate interests in . . . protecting the potential 
life within her”); id. at 872 (noting the same, but with the “State’s interest in promoting fetal 
life”); id. at 873 (“[T]he State has an interest in protecting the life of the unborn.”); id. at 875 
(discussing the “State’s interest in the potential life within the woman”); id. at 876 (“[T]he 
State has an interest in protecting fetal life or potential life.”); Roe, 410 U.S. at 150 (referring 
to “the State’s interest—some phrase it in terms of duty—in protecting prenatal life”); id. at 
154 (“[A] State may properly assert important interests . . . in protecting potential life.”); id. 
at 155 (“[A]t some point the state interests as to . . . prenatal life[] become[s] dominant.”); 
id. at 162 (indicating that the State “has still another important and legitimate interest in 
protecting the potentiality of human life”); id. at 163 (referring to the State’s “interest in 
potential life”); id. (“[T]he State is interested in protecting fetal life after viability . . . .”); see 
also Casey, 505 U.S. at 897–98 (holding that a spousal notification requirement justified by 
the “husband’s interest in the life of the child his wife is carrying,” and coupled with the 
State’s interest in potential life, does not outweigh “a wife’s liberty”); id. at 949, 974 
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the 
“potential life of the fetus”); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 221 (1973) (White, J., dissenting) 
(noting the same, but as the “life or potential life of the fetus”). 
 39 Casey, 505 U.S. at 846; see also Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 146 (assuming that “[b]efore 
viability, a State ‘may not prohibit any woman from making the ultimate decision to 
terminate her pregnancy.’” (quoting Casey, 505 U.S., at 879)). These are not the only 
interests that have been recognized in the Court’s abortion jurisprudence as it has developed 
over time, see, e.g., Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 158 (discussing the “additional ethical and moral 
concerns that justify a special prohibition,” in the form of the procedure banned by the federal 
law at issue in the case), and Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Kan. City, Mo., Inc., v. Ashcroft, 
462 U.S. 476, 490–91 (1983) (Powell, J., writing for himself and joined by Burger, C.J.) 
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In order to safeguard the constitutional abortion right from State efforts that 
would either take it away entirely or otherwise unduly constrain it, the Supreme 
Court has declared previability abortion prohibitions are unconstitutional and 
has held that previability abortion regulations are to be subjected to what it 
called an “undue burden” test.40 As Casey described the test: 
 A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state 
regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path 
of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus. A statute with this 
purpose is invalid because the means chosen by the State to further the interest 
in potential life must be calculated to inform the woman’s free choice, not 
hinder it. And a statute which, while furthering the interest in potential life or 
some other valid state interest, has the effect of placing a substantial obstacle 
in the path of a woman’s choice cannot be considered a permissible means of 
serving its legitimate ends.41 
The Supreme Court has recently clarified the operation of Casey’s undue 
burden test. In Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt,42 the Court held that this 
test serves as a means for courts to subject laws regulating abortion to a 
constitutional balancing of relevant interests. According to Whole Woman’s 
Health, the undue burden test works to ensure that the benefits of a State’s 
previability abortion regulation outweigh its relative imposition of costs on the 
exercise by pregnant women of their protected abortion rights. In the Court’s 
words: “The rule announced in Casey . . . requires that courts consider the 
burdens a law imposes on abortion access together with the benefits those laws 
confer.”43 Following this announcement, Whole Woman’s Health went on to 
strike down as unconstitutional State-imposed restrictions on the conditions 
under which abortions were to be provided. The particular measures at issue in 
the case failed to survive constitutional review because their benefits to women 
did not outweigh the burdens on abortion rights that they imposed.44 
In contrast with the significant constitutional restrictions on the State’s 
ability to regulate abortions before fetal viability, the rule since Roe has 
consistently been that the State’s interest in protecting and preserving the 
                                                                                                                     
(referring to the “State’s interest in protecting immature minors”), though they are the main 
ones.  
 40 See, e.g., Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 146 (applying Casey’s “standard to the cases at bar”); 
Casey, 505 U.S. at 878 (plurality opinion); see also Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 921, 
945–46 (2000) (applying the “undue burden” test to find state abortion statute 
unconstitutional). 
 41 Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (plurality opinion). 
 42 Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).  
 43 Id. at 2309 (first citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 887–98; and then citing id. at 898–901 
(plurality opinion)). 
 44 Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2310–18. For the Court’s treatment of other 
arguments made in the case, see id. at 2318–20. 
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(potential) life of the fetus becomes sufficiently powerful in constitutional terms 
at the point of viability that, from and after that time, the State is generally 
permitted to regulate a pregnant women’s abortion choice45—even to the point 
of prohibiting abortions altogether.46 This permission—it must quickly be 
added—is subject to one very important and sizeable exception.47 Even after 
viability, when the State’s interests in regulating abortion reach their height, the 
State must, if it chooses to exercise its permitted regulatory powers,48 make 
express exceptions in its rules for an abortion that is needed to protect or 
preserve a pregnant woman’s life or her health.49 This constitutionally required 
life and health exception is famously quite broad. The understanding of “health” 
that animates it includes both threats to a pregnant woman’s physical health, as 
well as to her psychological well-being.50 No abortion restriction that imperils 
                                                                                                                     
 45 See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (holding that “[b]efore viability, the State’s interests 
are not strong enough to support a prohibition of abortion or the imposition of a substantial 
obstacle to the woman’s effective right to elect the procedure,” but that after viability, “the 
State’s power to restrict abortions” rises to its highest constitutional heights). 
 46 But see infra notes 47–49 and accompanying text; see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 
(holding that the State may “restrict abortions after fetal viability, if the law contains 
exceptions for pregnancies which endanger the woman’s life or health”); id. at 879 (plurality 
opinion) (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164–65 (1973)); Roe, 410 U.S. at 163–65 
(same). 
 47 Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (holding that the State may “restrict abortions after fetal 
viability, if the law contains exceptions for pregnancies which endanger the woman’s life or 
health”); id. at 879 (plurality opinion) (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 164–65); Roe, 410 U.S. at 
163–65 (same). 
 48 This is not a constitutional obligation, only a constitutional permission. See, e.g., Roe, 
410 U.S. at 163–64 (“If the State is interested in protecting fetal life after viability, it may go 
so far as to proscribe abortion during that period, except when it is necessary to preserve the 
life or health of the mother.” (emphasis added)); id. at 163–65 (discussing the State’s 
authority and holding that “[f]or the stage subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its 
interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, 
abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation 
of the life or health of the mother” (emphasis added)). For further discussion of the contours 
of constitutional obligations and permissions, see generally Marc Spindelman, Death, Dying, 
and Domination, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1641 (2008) (engaging how these concepts play out in 
the constitutional right-to-die debates). 
 49 Casey, 505 U.S. at 846; Roe, 410 U.S. at 163–65. 
 50 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 170 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
Casey Court stated with unmistakable clarity that state regulation of access to abortion 
procedures, even after viability, must protect ‘the health of the woman.’” (quoting Casey, 
505 U.S. at 846)); Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 327–28 
(2006) (“[O]ur precedents hold[] that a State may not restrict access to abortions that are 
‘necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the 
[woman].’” (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 879 (plurality opinion))); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 
U.S. 914, 930 (2000) (“Since the law requires a health exception in order to validate even a 
postviability abortion regulation, it at a minimum requires the same in respect to previability 
regulation.” (first citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 880; and then citing Harris v. McRae, 448 
U.S. 297, 316 (1980))); Casey, 505 U.S. at 882 (plurality opinion) (“Those [earlier abortion] 
2018] OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL FURTHERMORE 29 
a woman’s life or health, broadly understood in this way, may stand even when 
the State’s authority to regulate abortions is at its constitutional apex.51 Of 
course, one practical consequence of this state of affairs, recognized by the 
Supreme Court, is that no previability abortion regulation that fails to create a 
                                                                                                                     
decisions . . . recognize a substantial government interest justifying a requirement that a 
woman be apprised of the health risks of abortion and childbirth. It cannot be questioned that 
psychological well-being is a facet of health.” (citation omitted)); see also Thornburgh v. 
Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 768–69 (1986) (invalidating a 
postviability abortion regulation that “failed to require that [a pregnant woman’s] health be 
the physician’s paramount consideration”); Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (“Maternity, or additional 
offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and future. Psychological harm may 
be imminent. Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care. There is also the 
distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of 
bringing a child into a family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. 
In other cases, as in this one, the additional difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed 
motherhood may be involved. All these are factors the woman and her responsible physician 
necessarily will consider in consultation.”); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973) (“[T]he 
medical judgment may be exercised in the light of all factors—physical, emotional, 
psychological, familial, and the woman’s age—relevant to the well-being of the patient. All 
these factors may relate to health.”); United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 72 (1971) 
(“Indeed, whether a particular operation is necessary for a patient’s physical or mental health 
is a judgment that physicians are obviously called upon to make routinely whenever surgery 
is considered.”); Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 209–10 (6th Cir. 
1997) (“[W]e emphasize that we are holding that a maternal health exception must 
encompass severe irreversible risks of mental and emotional harm. The State’s substantial 
interest in potential life must be reconciled with the woman’s constitutional right to protect 
her own life and health.”). The scope of the health exception has been a source of controversy 
in part on the ground that, as some commentators maintain, it makes the right to abortion 
throughout a pregnancy effectively a right to abortion on demand. See, e.g., Clarke D. 
Forsythe & Stephen B. Presser, The Tragic Failure of Roe v. Wade: Why Abortion Should 
Be Returned to the States, 10 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 85, 97 (2005) (“[N]o objective reader of 
Carhart could fail to conclude that Roe and Doe legalized abortion-on-demand from 
conception to birth for virtually any reason.”); Jay Alan Sekulow & John Tuskey, Essay, The 
“Center” Is in the Eye of the Beholder, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 945, 955 & n.62 (1996) 
(observing that “[g]iven this infinitely expandable definition of ‘health,’ ‘the truth of the 
matter about Roe is that something very much like the abortion-on-demand mandated for the 
first two trimesters persists until birth,’” and collecting some sources relevant to the point 
(quoting Gerard V. Bradley, Essay, Life’s Dominion: A Review Essay, 69 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 329, 335 (1993) (book review)).  
 51 Gonzales v. Carhart may be taken to stand for a different position, as suggested by 
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in the case, Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 170–71 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (describing the majority opinion as “alarming,” in part because “for the first time 
since Roe, the Court blesses a prohibition with no exception safeguarding a woman’s 
health”), but the reasons for thinking so are easily overblown. Marc Spindelman, On the 
Constitutionality of Ohio’s Proposed “Heartbeat Bill,” 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 149, 179–84 (2013) 
(engaging the arguments for a robust pro-life reading of Gonzales v. Carhart while ultimately 
suggesting that such a reading of the case, based on its text and structure, should not be 
preferred to a more modest one). 
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safe harbor for abortions needed to protect or preserve a pregnant woman’s life 
or health is constitutional either.52 
IV. APPLYING THE CONSTITUTIONAL RULES TO H.B. 214 
Given the continuing significance of the viability line in the Supreme 
Court’s abortion doctrine, and the different constitutional rules that apply in the 
previability and postviability settings, analysis of the constitutionality of H.B. 
214 is divided into two parts. First is a discussion of the constitutionality of H.B. 
214 in its previability operations. And second is a discussion of the 
constitutionality of H.B. 214 as it functions postviability. 
A. The Previability Operation of H.B. 214 
Insofar as H.B. 214 bans a class of abortions outright prior to viability, it 
amounts to a previability abortion ban in flat contradiction of Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey’s understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment. So much 
must immediately be understood in view of Casey’s instruction that, 
previability, the State’s interests in regulating abortion “are not strong enough 
to support a prohibition of abortion or the imposition of a substantial obstacle to 
the woman’s effective right to elect the [abortion] procedure.”53 As a 
previability abortion ban, H.B. 214 is the sort of “prohibition of abortion” that 
Casey was talking about. The law strips a pregnant woman of the previability 
choice that, constitutionally speaking, is ultimately hers to make.54 
In a recent case from Indiana, Planned Parenthood of Indiana & Kentucky, 
Inc., v. Commissioner, Indiana State Department of Health,55 a federal district 
court reached this very conclusion in relation to an Indiana law, House Enrolled 
                                                                                                                     
 52 Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 930 (“Since the law requires a health exception in order to 
validate even a postviability abortion regulation, it at a minimum requires the same in respect 
to previability regulation.” (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 880)). 
 53 Casey, 505 U.S. at 846; see also Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 146 (assuming that “[b]efore 
viability, a State ‘may not prohibit any woman from making the ultimate decision to 
terminate her pregnancy’” (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 879 (plurality opinion))). 
 54 See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 146 (assuming that “[b]efore viability, a State ‘may not 
prohibit any woman from making the ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy’” 
(quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 879 (plurality opinion))); accord Hearing on H.R. 214 Before 
the H. Health Comm., 132d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2017–2018) (statement of B. 
Jessie Hill, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Judge Ben C. Green Professor of Law, 
Case Western Reserve University at 1) (“HB 214 is clearly unconstitutional, first, for the 
reason that it is a total ban on certain previability abortions. . . . In fact, no court has upheld 
a law that entirely bans previability abortions, whether for all women or some subcategory 
of women.” (citations omitted)). 
 55 Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm’r, Ind. State Dep’t of Health, 265 
F. Supp. 3d 859 (S.D. Ind. 2017). 
2018] OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL FURTHERMORE 31 
Act 1337 (H.E.A. 1337),56 that (until it was struck down as unconstitutional) 
bore a family resemblance to H.B. 214.57 In the course of ruling on Indiana’s 
abortion ban, the district court observed that:  
 The anti-discrimination provisions of HEA 1337 clearly . . . prevent 
women from obtaining abortions before fetal viability. The woman’s right to 
choose to terminate a pregnancy pre-viability[, however,] is categorical: “a 
State may not prohibit any woman from making the ultimate decision to 
terminate her pregnancy before viability.” . . .  
 . . . . 
 . . . The anti-discrimination provisions [of H.E.A. 1337] prohibit a woman 
from choosing to terminate a pregnancy pre-viability if the abortion is sought 
solely for one of the enumerated reasons. . . . [I]t is a woman’s right to choose 
                                                                                                                     
 56 H.R. 1337, 119th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2016), declared unconstitutional 
by Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., 265 F. Supp. 3d at 869. According to the description 
of H.E.A. 1337 in Planned Parenthood of Indiana & Kentucky: 
Specifically, HEA 1337 provides that “[a] person may not intentionally perform or 
attempt to perform an abortion before the earlier of viability of the fetus or twenty (20) 
weeks of postfertilization age if the person knows that the pregnant woman is seeking” 
an abortion: (1) “solely because of the sex of the fetus,” §§ 16–34–4–4, 16–34–4–5; (2) 
“solely because the fetus has been diagnosed with, or has a potential diagnosis of, Down 
syndrome or any other disability,” §§ 16–34–4–6, 16–34–4–7; or (3) “solely because of 
the race, color, national origin, or ancestry of the fetus,” § 16–34–4–8. The phrase 
“potential diagnosis” is defined as “the presence of some risk factors that indicate that 
a health problem may occur.” Ind. Code § 16–34–4–3.  
Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., 265 F. Supp. 3d at 862. 
 57 Other laws with a family resemblance to H.B. 214 include a North Dakota law that 
bans physicians from “intentionally perform[ing] or attempt[ing] to perform an 
abortion . . . that the pregnant woman is seeking . . . solely . . . [o]n account of the sex of the 
unborn child; or . . . [b]ecause the unborn child has been diagnosed with either a genetic 
abnormality or a potential for a genetic abnormality,” Abortion Control Act, N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 14-02.1-04.1(1) (2017), and that defines “genetic abnormality” to include a range of 
conditions including Down syndrome. Id. § 14-02.1-02(4), (7) (broadly defining “genetic 
abnormality” as encompassing a range of conditions including Down syndrome). The 
category also includes a Louisiana law that prohibits abortions after twenty weeks “post-
fertilization age . . . with knowledge that the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely 
because the unborn child has been diagnosed with either a genetic abnormality or a potential 
for a genetic abnormality,” Human Life Protection Act, LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:1061.1.2(B) 
(Supp. 2018), with Down syndrome being one of the conditions listed in the measure as a 
“genetic abnormality.” Id. § 40:1061.1.2(A)(3). Both these laws have been subject to 
challenge in federal court. June Med. Servs., LLC v. Gee, 280 F. Supp. 3d 849 (M.D. La. 
2017) (challenging Louisiana measure); MKB Mgmt. Corp. v. Burdick, 954 F. Supp. 2d 900 
(D.N.D. 2013) (dismissing without prejudice challenge to North Dakota ban on abortions 
involving sex selection and “genetic abnormalities”); see also Legislative Tracker: Genetic 
Anomalies, REWIRE.NEWS, https://rewire.news/legislative-tracker/law-topic/genetic-anomalies-
abortion-ban/ [https://perma.cc/XUS7-K5HH] (tracking “genetic anomaly” laws and 
legislation). 
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an abortion that is protected, which, of course, leaves no room for the State to 
examine, let alone prohibit, the basis or bases upon which a woman makes her 
choice.58 
As might be expected, the view of H.B. 214 as an unconstitutional 
prohibition on previability abortions is fully in keeping with the conclusion 
about the measure that would be reached under Casey’s undue burden test, 
including as that test has been clarified by Whole Woman’s Health.59 This is the 
Whole Woman’s Health Court speaking: “The rule announced in 
Casey . . . requires that courts consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion 
access together with the benefits those laws confer.”60 Seen in this light, H.B. 
214, with its prohibition on abortion if the actual, expected, or believed 
Down-syndrome status of the fetus plays any part in a pregnant woman’s 
decision to end her pregnancy and the abortion provider knows about it, is a 
100% burden on her constitutionally protected choice. It obliterates it. And it 
                                                                                                                     
 58 Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., 265 F. Supp. 3d at 866–67 (quoting Casey, 505 
U.S. at 879 (plurality opinion)). As support for its position that the State has “no room . . . to 
examine, let alone prohibit, the basis or bases upon which a woman makes her choice,” the 
opinion cites Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (majority opinion), and id. at 879 (plurality opinion). 
Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., 265 F. Supp. 3d at 867. Mary Ziegler reaches the same 
conclusion about disability-based abortion bans, more generally, in Mary Ziegler, The 
Disability Politics of Abortion, 2017 UTAH L. REV. 587, 615–19 (2017) (engaging the 
constitutionality of disability-based abortion prohibitions). 
 59 Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309 (2016). There is some 
debate in the lower courts about the meaning and scope of the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt. How lower courts have been analyzing the decision 
is usefully traced in Leah M. Litman, Unduly Burdening Women’s Health: How Lower 
Courts Are Undermining Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 116 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 
50 (2017). While the approach here tracks the language of Whole Woman’s Health, and sees 
its balancing inquiry as a general approach to applying Casey’s “undue burden” test, nothing 
for purposes of accounting for the unconstitutionality of H.B. 214’s previability operation as 
an abortion ban turns on it. The same point could readily be made directly in terms of Casey 
and its own understanding and deployment of the “undue burden” test. 
 60 Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2309 (first citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 887–98; 
and then citing id. at 899–901 (plurality opinion)); accord Greer Donley, Does the 
Constitution Protect Abortions Based on Fetal Anomaly?: Examining the Potential for 
Disability-Selective Abortion Bans in the Age of Prenatal Whole Genome Sequencing, 20 
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 291, 324 (2013) (discussing a North Dakota “disability-based abortion 
ban” and observing that, as a legal measure that “actually outlaws certain pre-viability 
abortions[,] [i]t is . . . an explicit rejection of the Court’s holding in Roe, as interpreted by 
Casey, that the government cannot prevent women from obtaining a pre-viability abortion”); 
Jaime Staples King, Not This Child: Constitutional Questions in Regulating Noninvasive 
Prenatal Genetic Diagnosis and Selective Abortion, 60 UCLA L. REV. 2, 36 (2012) 
(“Because [reasons-based abortion prohibitions] proscribe providers from knowingly 
performing abortions sought for designated reasons, this alone could constitute an undue 
burden for all women seeking abortions for those reasons.”). Thanks to Maya Manian for 
introducing me to Donley’s and King’s work. 
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does so while offering no offsetting benefits to a pregnant woman in relation to 
the exercise of her constitutionally protected choice. Whole Woman’s Health,61 
reaffirming Casey’s rule in this respect,62 instructs that abortion bans like H.B. 
214, which offer all burdens and no benefits to pregnant women exercising their 
previability abortion rights, violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause.63 
That said, it might be contended that H.B. 214 is not like other familiar 
abortion prohibitions that have been enacted to date, and that, as a result, a 
different and more nuanced constitutional analysis of it is in order. H.B. 214, 
like similar, recent measures in other jurisdictions, may be thought to have a 
novel-ish quality to it.64 H.B. 214 is not a categorical bar on abortions that 
focuses on an abortion procedure, like the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban 
                                                                                                                     
 61 See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2310–18. 
 62 See, e.g., id. at 2321 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“So long as this Court adheres to Roe 
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 . . . (1973), and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833 . . . (1992), Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers laws like H.B. 2 that 
‘do little or nothing for health, but rather strew impediments to abortion,’ Planned 
Parenthood of Wis.[, Inc. v. Schimel,] 806 F. 3d [908,] 921 [(7th Cir. 2015)], cannot survive 
judicial inspection.”). 
 63 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The same conclusion would be reached even if Whole 
Woman’s Health were to be understood as leaving open the prospect of a broader kind of 
balancing of interests that would include the State’s interest in the (potential) life of the fetus 
and the State’s interest in other considerations, like the equal dignity and worth of persons 
with Down syndrome (or persons with disabilities or vulnerable populations more generally, 
see infra Part IV.B.2). This is so because of H.B. 214’s total burden on a pregnant woman’s 
constitutionally protected previability choice. Thanks to Jessie Hill for the reminder of the 
possibility of the alternative understanding of Whole Woman’s Health, and how it might play 
out in this setting. 
 64 This is not to agree with the position that the State advanced in Planned Parenthood 
of Indiana & Kentucky, Inc. v. Commissioner, Indiana State Department of Health, 
“posit[ing] that HEA 1337 represents a ‘qualitatively new kind of [abortion] statute.’” 265 
F. Supp. 3d 859, 865 (2017). Much less does it mean to affirm the argument made by the 
State of Ohio in the challenge to H.B. 214, to the effect that the law “falls outside the analysis 
of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 
(1992).” Response in Opposition to Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and 
Preliminary Injunction at iii, Preterm-Cleveland v. Himes, No. 1:18-cv-109 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 
3, 2018); see also id. at 18–30 (elaborating the argument). Earlier iterations of measures 
sufficiently like H.B. 214 so as to undermine claims about its novelty are noted in King, 
supra note 60, at 27 (“Before 2009, only two states, Pennsylvania and Illinois, had passed 
laws prohibiting physicians from providing abortion based on the mother’s reason for 
wanting it.”), and are traced in Justin Gillette, Comment, Pregnant and Prejudiced: The 
Constitutionality of Sex- and Race-Selective Abortion Restrictions, 88 WASH. L. REV. 645, 
650–55 (2013) (noting some of the history of “motive-based abortion restrictions”). Indeed, 
against the thought that there is something novel or novel-ish about H.B. 214, it may be said 
even more strongly that the measure is a non-novel continuation of an older and larger march 
toward barring abortion from conception on. See infra note 74. 
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Act of 200365 upheld in Gonzales v. Carhart.66 Nor is H.B. 214 a categorical 
bar on abortion that focuses on fetal anatomical development, like Ohio’s 
postviability ban,67 its 6-to-8-week-on abortion ban called the “Heartbeat 
Bill,”68 its 20-week-on abortion ban,69 or other measures that would ban 
abortion from the point of conception on. By contrast, H.B. 214’s abortion 
prohibition trains its sights on the workings of a pregnant woman’s mind: her 
deliberative decisional processes. H.B. 214’s legal block on abortions only 
arises when a pregnant woman seeks an abortion “in whole or in part, because 
of . . . [a] test result indicating Down syndrome in”70 the fetus she carries, “[a] 
prenatal diagnosis of Down syndrome in”71 the fetus, or “[a]ny other reason 
[that the woman has or might have] to believe” that the fetus “has Down 
syndrome,”72 and—importantly—where the pregnant woman’s reasons for 
wanting an abortion are also known by the person being asked to perform or 
induce or who seeks to perform or induce the abortion that the pregnant woman 
wants.73 Should a pregnant woman’s reasons for seeking an abortion change, 
then so might the abortion’s legality. 
Understood this way, H.B. 214 is an abortion prohibition that might be 
typed a “decisional prohibition” on abortion,74 a characterization whose utility 
neither alters nor affects the constitutional conclusion about it under governing 
                                                                                                                     
 65 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2012) (effective Nov. 6, 2003). 
 66 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007). Or similarly Ohio’s “partial birth 
feticide” ban, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.151 (West, Westlaw through File 51 of 132d 
Gen. Assemb. (2017–2018)) (effective Aug. 18, 2000), the constitutionality of which was 
affirmed by Women’s Medical Professional Corp. v. Taft, 353 F.3d 436, 445 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 67 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.17(A) (barring postviability abortions). 
 68 H.R. 258, 132d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2017) (as reported by the H. Health 
Comm., Dec. 13, 2017) (prohibiting “an abortion of an unborn human individual with a 
detectable heartbeat”). Discussion of the constitutionality of a predecessor measure is in 
Spindelman, supra note 51. 
 69 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.18 (prohibiting the “performance of an abortion on a 
pregnant woman when the probable post-fertilization age of the unborn child is twenty weeks 
or greater”); see also infra notes 121, 141 and accompanying text. 
 70 Id. § 2919.10(B)(1).  
 71 Id. § 2919.10(B)(2). 
 72 Id. § 2919.10(B)(3). 
 73 Id. § 2919.10(B). 
 74 These measures have elsewhere been termed “reasons-based” abortion bans, King, 
supra note 60, at 5 (“I refer to these types of restrictions as reasons-based abortion 
prohibitions (RBAPs).”), and “motive-based restrictions,” Gillette, supra note 64, at 646. 
Past these ways of characterizing these measures is a point of view that sees them as simple 
abortion bans. See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 135 Before the H. Cmty. & Family Advancement 
Comm., 131st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2015–2016) (statement of Jaime Miracle, 
Deputy Director, NARAL Pro-Choice Ohio at 1) [hereinafter Miracle H.R. 135 Testimony: 
H. Cmty. & Family Advancement Comm.] (“This bill is . . . an unconstitutional attempt to 
limit access to a health care procedure.”). 
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case law.75 This is because once a pregnant woman’s reasons include a 
prohibited ground of decision in any way, and once another person who will 
help her carry out her choice to terminate the pregnancy knows of her illicit 
reason (or reasons) for seeking an abortion, no abortion may lawfully be 
provided to her. Instead, a physician will face a triple threat of sanctions—
criminal, professional, and civil, all—for respecting a pregnant woman’s choice. 
It is for these reasons that H.B. 214, despite whatever novel qualities it may 
have, is practically and doctrinally just like any other previability abortion 
prohibition that stands in the way of the right of a pregnant woman to make “the 
ultimate decision”76 whether to terminate a pregnancy as a matter of 
constitutional right. That decision is to be made by her for herself, not for her 
by the State, as H.B. 214 would do, taking the right to choose away from her.  
To reiterate: The State’s choice of means for barring abortion—whether 
focused on an abortion procedure, a developmental landmark, or the 
constellation of a pregnant woman’s decision-making—does not matter from a 
constitutional perspective. What matters is whether the State is prohibiting a 
pregnant woman from making her constitutionally protected choice. Prior to 
fetal viability, the State has no valid, constitutionally recognized reason for not 
finally allowing a pregnant woman to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy 
or to carry to term for reasons that are her own, unaccountable to the State.77 
This conclusion can be explained by looking at H.B. 214 on a different and 
deeper level. H.B. 214 arrives on a field of constitutional law suffused with 
intuitions and rules about the boundaries of relations between and among the 
pregnant woman, her attending physician, and the State. For its part, H.B. 214 
is written in a way that presupposes that the State has the constitutional authority 
to operationalize the reasons that a pregnant woman has for exercising her 
constitutional right to end her pregnancy as part of the State’s own governance 
                                                                                                                     
 75 King, supra note 60, at 32 (“The decision to have an abortion based on a genetic 
condition is no less intimate, challenging, or important than the decision to have it for any 
other reason.”).  
 76 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 875, 877, 879 (1992) 
(plurality opinion). 
 77 Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016) (noting that 
laws imposing “substantial obstacle[s] in the path of [women]” who seek previability 
abortions are “undue burden[s] on abortion access” (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 878 
(plurality opinion)); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 146 (2007) (“Casey, in short, struck 
a balance [between a pregnant woman’s right to “mak[e] the ultimate decision to terminate 
her pregnancy” and the State’s interest in “express[ing] [its] profound respect for the life of 
the unborn”]. The balance was central to its holding.”); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 
921 (2000) (observing that “the Constitution offers basic protection to the woman’s right to 
choose”); Casey, 505 U.S. at 870 (plurality opinion) (“We conclude the line should be drawn 
at viability, so that before that time the woman has a right to choose to terminate her 
pregnancy.”); id. at 879 (“[A] State may not prohibit any woman from making the ultimate 
decision to terminate her pregnancy before viability.”); id. at 872 (noting that before 
viability, “the woman has a right to choose to terminate or continue her pregnancy”).  
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apparatus. As the district court in Planned Parenthood of Indiana & Kentucky, 
Inc. observed, however, the constitutional protections afforded a pregnant 
woman’s right to choose in the Supreme Court’s abortion case law “leave[] no 
room for the State to examine, let alone prohibit, the basis or bases upon which 
a woman makes her choice.”78  
This idea is very important in this setting, and so it is worth looking at it in 
greater depth. When the Supreme Court reaffirmed the “essential holding”79 of 
Roe v. Wade in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the controlling opinion in Casey 
underscored how Roe and its protections for reproductive choice were situated 
“at an intersection of two lines of [Supreme Court] decisions.”80 The first line 
of decisions focused (then and now) on “the liberty relating to intimate 
relationships, the family, and decisions about whether or not to beget or bear a 
child.”81 The second line of decisions involved (then and now) “cases 
recognizing limits on governmental power to mandate medical treatment or to 
bar its rejection.”82 
Both of these lines of cases demonstrate great respect for “decisional 
autonomy,” by which is meant here not merely freedom from State efforts that 
would block a final, constitutionally protected choice from being made, but also 
a certain freedom in and throughout the last processes of decision-making 
themselves.83 To illustrate, consider the right to marry, protected as part of “the 
                                                                                                                     
 78 Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm’r, Ind. State Dep’t of Health 265 
F. Supp. 3d 859, 867 (S.D. Ind. 2017). 
 79 Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (majority opinion). Other appearances of this language from 
Casey are collected in supra note 33. 
 80 Casey, 505 U.S. at 857. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 See Gillette, supra note 64, at 666–67, 671–74 (discussing decisional autonomy in 
the context of the Supreme Court’s reproductive rights decisions, with an emphasis on 
Casey). In the course of sketching some of the scope of the pregnant woman’s right to 
decisional autonomy, Roe focused on the impact of denying the pregnant woman a right to 
make the abortion decision in consultation with her physician: 
 This right of privacy . . . is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision 
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. The detriment that the State would impose 
upon the pregnant woman by denying this choice altogether is apparent. Specific and 
direct harm medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, 
or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and future. 
Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health may be taxed by 
child care. There is also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted 
child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a family already unable, 
psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In other cases, as in this one, the additional 
difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved. All these are 
factors the woman and her responsible physician necessarily will consider in 
consultation. 
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liberty relating to intimate relationships” and “the family.” In the right-to-marry 
setting, the State is obligated to recognize the decision to marry for those who 
are entitled to exercise the right. This obligation in no way authorizes the State 
to ask the parties to a would-be marriage to give the State an accounting of their 
reasons for marrying, such as by declaring how deeply or counting all the ways 
that they love one another. Nor could the State condition the right to marry on 
the reasons that an individual has for exercising the right.84 People get to choose 
to marry someone whom the right to marry lets them choose to marry—or not—
whether the State believes their actual reasons are good or bad or wrong or right. 
That is just what the freedom to marry that is constitutionally protected means.  
Or take a related example from the same line of cases: In the realm of 
parental decision-making, where the State must let parents make certain choices 
about the welfare of their children,85 the State cannot ordinarily put parents to 
the test of explaining their reasons for making a particular, constitutionally 
protected decision about their child’s or their children’s well-being.  
The same point holds true in the other line of cases to which Casey noted 
the abortion right is related, which includes certain kinds of end-of-life decisions 
that individuals make.86 The constitutional right to refuse unwanted medical 
treatment, with its common-law foundations,87 is to be exercised for whatever 
reasons an individual might have for exercising it—whether altruistic or purely 
self-regarding or somewhere in between—even in those cases in which the 
choice to exercise the right might lead to the decision maker’s own death.88 
Because this is a constitutionally protected right, the State cannot condition its 
exercise on whether the State approves or disapproves of the reasons an 
individual has for making her or his or their constitutionally protected choice. 
As in these various settings—settings in which the State may not condition 
the exercise of a constitutionally protected right on the basis of what it maintains 
                                                                                                                     
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); see also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598–600 
(1977) (discussing two different types of privacy interests: “the individual interest in 
avoiding disclosure of personal matters,” and “the interest in independence in making certain 
kinds of important decisions”). 
 84 For an illustration, see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (“The Fourteenth 
Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial 
discriminations. Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of 
another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State.”). 
 85 See, for example, the classic decisions in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 
(1923), and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). 
 86 See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) (“[F]or purposes 
of this case, we assume that the United States Constitution would grant a competent person 
a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.”). 
 87 Id. at 268–79 (discussing the common-law foundations of the right to refuse 
unwanted medical treatment). 
 88 Id. at 279 (“But for purposes of this case, we assume that the United States 
Constitution would grant a competent person a constitutionally protected right to refuse 
lifesaving hydration and nutrition.”). 
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are the right sorts of reasons—so, too, the idea is, in relation to the right to 
abortion.89 The existence and recognition of this constitutional right means that 
the choice whether to exercise it—including the reasons why—ultimately 
belongs to the pregnant woman when the decision is hers to make. As Justice 
John Paul Stevens once observed, “[i]t is inherent in the right to make the 
abortion decision that the right may be exercised without public scrutiny and in 
defiance of the contrary opinion of the sovereign or other third parties.”90 
What has been said to this point has been said with some care in the 
articulation. This is because it turns out that the abortion right is not a right that, 
in recent years anyway, has been defined to its very core by freedom from State 
involvement in the processes of individual decision-making. Without question, 
Casey made plain that “[t]he woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy before 
viability is the most central principle of Roe v. Wade[,]”91 and it called this right 
“a rule of law and a component of liberty”92 that it emphatically refused to 
“renounce.”93 But the governing opinion in Casey also went out of its way to 
note that it would be a mistake—or, more precisely, as the opinion put it, “an 
overstatement”—“to describe [the abortion right] as a right to decide whether to 
have an abortion ‘without interference from the State.’”94 What the opinion 
meant by that was illuminated to an important degree when it turned to discuss 
the “guiding principles”95 of the Supreme Court’s earlier abortion decisions to 
which it was largely recommitting itself. In that context, the lead opinion in 
Casey remarked that “[w]hat is at stake is the woman’s right to make the 
ultimate decision, not a right to be insulated from all others in doing so.”96 This 
is decisional autonomy, but within limits. Understanding this helps explain how 
Casey could countenance and affirm both the pregnant woman’s right to make 
the final abortion decision previability and also the State’s authority to enact 
measures “designed to persuade her to choose childbirth over abortion”97 and 
how Casey could also approve previability regulations of abortion designed to 
ensure that a woman’s final choices—which were and remained hers—were 
meaningfully informed, knowing, voluntary, and deliberate. 
                                                                                                                     
 89 See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 215 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“Georgia’s 
enactment has a constitutional infirmity because, as stated by the District Court, it ‘limits the 
number of reasons for which an abortion may be sought.’” (citing United States. v. Vuitich, 
402 U.S. 62, 72 (1971)). 
 90 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 655 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 91 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871 (1992) (plurality opinion). 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. at 875 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 61 
(1976)). 
 95 Id. at 877–79. 
 96 Id. at 877. 
 97 Casey, 505 U.S. at 878 (plurality opinion). 
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But while Casey went this far, allowing some incursions on a pregnant 
woman’s decisional autonomy designed to influence her decision whether to 
end or to continue her pregnancy, the controlling opinion in the case did not 
otherwise displace the situated sense in this area of doctrine,98 with its two 
converging lines of cases, that the State may not hold a woman who exercises 
the abortion right to account by “examining”99 her reasons for doing so. Stated 
differently, Casey recognizes and makes some room for the State’s authority to 
attempt to influence a pregnant woman’s abortion decision—by, for instance, 
requiring that she be given “truthful, nonmisleading information about the 
nature of the procedure, the attendant health risks and those of childbirth, and 
the ‘probable gestational age’ of the fetus,”100 and even by making her wait a 
short, reasonable amount of time to deliberate over this serious decision101—
but it does so without suggesting that the State may additionally ask a pregnant 
woman to account for her reasons for exercising her right. Much less did Casey 
authorize the State to do what H.B. 214 does: make a pregnant woman’s reasons 
for exercising her constitutional right to abortion the very condition for the 
right’s legal exercise. Nothing in Casey embraces the proposition H.B. 214 
crucially depends upon: that a pregnant woman has a constitutional right prior 
to viability to make the final abortion decision except when the State dislikes 
her reasons for exercising that right. This is so even if the State has what may 
be regarded as good reasons for its own preferences. 
True enough, Casey did and does allow the State to “require a woman to 
give her written informed consent to an abortion.”102 To that extent, it might be 
thought that the State is constitutionally permitted to hold pregnant women and 
their reasons to account under law. But there is still an important difference to 
be found between: (1) an informed consent mechanism that acknowledges that 
a pregnant woman has received certain types of information reasonably deemed 
material by the State, and that acknowledges that a pregnant woman has made 
an informed, knowing, voluntary, and deliberate decision to end her pregnancy; 
and (2) a State law that conditions a pregnant woman’s right to an abortion upon 
her reasons for exercising that right. If the legitimacy of an informed consent 
procedure seems—as, to some, it might—to be no different than a more 
                                                                                                                     
 98 Karl Llewellyn’s related concept of “situation sense” is productively discussed in, 
and critically engaged by, WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST 
MOVEMENT 216–27 (1973). “Situation sense” has profitably been tied to “Jerome Frank’s 
use of ‘gestalt’ and Hutcheson’s use of ‘hunching[.]’” Samuel J.M. Donnelly, Book Reviews, 
3 HOFSTRA L. REV. 899, 909 (1975) (first citing JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 165–85, 
170–71, 175–79 (1950); and then citing Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: 
The Function of the “Hunch” in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274 (1929)). 
 99 Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm’r, Ind. State Dep’t of Health, 265 
F. Supp. 3d 859, 867 (S.D. Ind. 2017). 
 100 Casey, 505 U.S. at 882 (plurality opinion). 
 101 See id. at 881, 885–87. 
 102 Id. at 881. 
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substantive inquiry into a pregnant woman’s reasons for exercising her 
constitutional right, the practical difference between a procedural and 
substantive accounting may be to little avail. But whether the line is nonexistent 
or subtle from one angle of vision, it is very bold from another, seen in terms of 
its effects. To say a pregnant woman must give informed consent in the course 
of the exercise of her constitutional right to choose to end her pregnancy prior 
to viability leaves the final decision in her hands. To say the State can condition 
her exercise of her rights depending on her reasons, does not. In that case, the 
State makes the decision for her. It forces her to live by the State’s reasons and 
under the State’s rule.103 
No constitutional analysis of H.B. 214 that is faithful to the relevant 
precedents and constitutional principles for which they stand could possibly 
miss this difference between a pregnant woman making the final choice about 
whether and why to exercise her constitutional right and the State making that 
decision for her. Nor should the major shift that would be required in the 
constitutional landscape for H.B. 214 to be upheld as a previability abortion ban 
be overlooked. To appreciate why the alteration of the landscape would be 
significant, it should be enough to recall that Casey reaffirmed that the pregnant 
woman’s previability decision whether to continue or end her pregnancy is 
ultimately hers.104 Uphold H.B. 214, and the consistent structure of the right to 
abortion since Roe and since Casey—which has preserved and safeguarded the 
pregnant woman’s right to make the final previability abortion decision for 
herself and for her own reasons—ceases to be what it was. It is easy to imagine 
how a decision validating H.B. 214 could be the change that prefigures Roe’s 
fall. 
That is not the end of the matter, however. There is another reason that 
upholding H.B. 214 as constitutional would work a major change in the existing 
constitutional abortion rights landscape. It is also, not incidentally, a second 
reason why H.B. 214 is unconstitutional in its previability operations.  
As noted earlier, H.B. 214 contains no exception within it for abortions 
needed to protect or to preserve a pregnant woman’s life or health. This is so 
despite the fact that throughout the course of pregnancy, the State is 
constitutionally required, and has long been constitutionally required, to allow 
a pregnant woman to terminate an unwanted pregnancy not only when the 
                                                                                                                     
 103 B. Jessie Hill, Regulating Reasons: Governmental Regulation of Private 
Deliberation in Reproductive Decision Making, in LAW, RELIGION, AND HEALTH IN THE 
UNITED STATES 348, 352 (Holly Fernandez Lynch et al. eds., 2017) (“There is, therefore, a 
difference between deliberation-forcing mechanisms, such as reasonable informed consent 
requirements, and coercion, such as taking abortion off-limits altogether when it is sought 
for certain reasons.”); id. at 355 (“Indeed, though the contours of the substantive due process 
right to privacy are unclear, the ability to deliberate and make decisions without coercive 
governmental judgments as to what are appropriate and inappropriate reasons is surely at the 
core of the right.”). 
 104 See supra notes 32–44 and accompanying text. 
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decision is on the general terrain of her conscientious choice, but also, more 
particularly, when the pregnancy would pose a danger to her life or to her 
health.105 Under H.B. 214, a pregnant woman cannot have a legal abortion if a 
medical practitioner knows her reasons for wanting one are “in whole or in 
part,”106 because of “[a] test result indicating Down syndrome in”107 the fetus 
she carries, because of “[a] prenatal diagnosis of Down syndrome in”108 the 
fetus she carries, or because of “[a]ny other reason [that the woman has or might 
have] to believe that” the fetus she carries “has Down syndrome.”109 If any of 
these reasons plays any part in a pregnant woman’s abortion decision and the 
person performing the procedure knows it, the abortion is criminal. According 
to H.B. 214’s language, it does not matter that one of the illicit reasons it 
enumerates is a relatively minor calculation in the pregnant woman’s decision, 
even a miniscule one, and that the overwhelmingly major driver of the decision 
to end a pregnancy is the threat that the pregnancy poses to a pregnant woman’s 
life or her health. No abortion prohibition that forces a pregnant woman to meet 
these risks to her life or health and their possible materialization could be upheld 
consistent with existing constitutional rules. 
And so it is that a ruling upholding a measure like H.B. 214 would 
necessarily be a big-footed step into a new era of abortion jurisprudence—an 
era in which the right to end an pregnancy belongs to a pregnant woman only 
insofar as she has what the State deems to be the right sorts of reasons for ending 
her pregnancy, even when her life or her health is at stake.110 In that new era, it 
would no longer be true, as it consistently has been since Roe to the present day, 
that the right to end a previability abortion belongs to the pregnant woman and 
to her alone in ways that are finally, in terms of her deepest reasons, 
unaccountable to the State. 
                                                                                                                     
 105 See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 930 (2000) (“Since the law requires a 
health exception in order to validate even a postviability abortion regulation, it at a minimum 
requires the same in respect to previability regulation.” (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 880)). 
 106 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.10(B) (West, Westlaw through File 51 of 132d Gen. 
Assemb. (2017–2018)). 
 107 Id. § 2919.10(B)(1). 
 108 Id. § 2919.10(B)(2). 
 109 Id. § 2919.10(B)(3). 
 110 See King, supra note 60, at 38. As King explains: 
To date, the Court has never permitted a law to directly prohibit a woman from having 
a previability abortion once she has decided to do so. Under a liberty-based 
interpretation, the Court should stay on this path. Permitting the state to regulate access 
to abortion sought for certain reasons, but not others, invites states to pass numerous 
[reasons-based abortion prohibitions] to redefine the boundaries of the abortion right, 
thereby creating a significant amount of arguably arbitrary line-drawing work for the 
Court. More damning, this approach would allow direct governmental intervention into 
a woman’s reproductive decisionmaking process. 
Id. 
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One final observation must be made at this point. It should give not only 
opponents of H.B. 214, but also at least some of its supporters, some very real 
cause for pause. Given how women’s abortion rights are complexly woven into 
the fabric of constitutional law,111 to hold that a pregnant woman as a 
right-holder may be held to account by the State for her reasons for exercising 
her constitutionally protected right to abortion might well prove to be, as a 
matter of principle, a highly volatile move. Once fixed in the abortion setting, 
there is no guarantee it would remain limited to it. Recognizing “[t]he tendency 
of a principle to expand itself to the limit of its logic,”112 a decision that the right 
to abortion may be conditioned upon the reasons a pregnant woman has for 
exercising the right could readily lead to the principle’s expansion beyond the 
abortion context. If so, would-be spouses, actual parents, and other individuals 
exercising constitutionally protected rights safeguarded by the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, including rights affecting bodily autonomy 
and medical decision-making, could soon find themselves having the State 
superintending and second-guessing their reasons for exercising their erstwhile 
constitutional rights. In some instances, these individuals could find themselves 
having lost their ability to exercise their constitutional rights for their own 
reasons in the face of the State’s contrary judgment that those reasons are not 
the right or good enough ones. In principle, the implications of a ruling 
upholding H.B. 214 might reach even further than those rights protected solely 
as a matter of substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. A 
regime that, as a matter of constitutional principle, affirmed individual 
accountability to the State for one’s reasons for exercising one’s constitutional 
rights could easily become a regime in which the State might condition the 
exercise of, say, free speech or religious freedom claims under the First 
Amendment, or gun rights under the Second, or, come to think of it, any of the 
rights protected by the Bill of Rights made applicable to the States by virtue of 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, on the sorts of reasons that 
the State deems acceptable for their use.  
To be sure, a reply is readily in sight: The abortion right may be complexly 
woven into the fabric of constitutional law, and hence be complexly related to a 
range of other constitutionally protected rights, but it is also, as the lead opinion 
in Casey noted, a right that implicates a situation “unique to the human condition 
and so unique to the law.”113 Emphasizing this uniqueness, a decision upholding 
                                                                                                                     
 111 See supra text accompanying notes 79–82 (discussing Casey’s affirmation of this 
point). 
 112 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, Lecture II. The Methods of History, Tradition and 
Sociology, in THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 51, 51 (1921). 
 113 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992) (“Abortion is a 
unique act. . . . [T]he liberty of the woman is at stake in a sense unique to the human 
condition and so unique to the law.”); id. at 857 (“Finally, one could classify Roe as sui 
generis.”). Focusing on this point in the Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence may bring 
to mind the “real” or “natural” differences strain within the Supreme Court’s sex-equality 
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H.B. 214 and its ban on abortions sought for what the State deems the wrong 
sorts of reasons need not be a precedent that begins to unravel the larger 
constitutional tradition of individual rights.  
This might be right, but the idea that abortion is unique to the human 
condition and so to the law is an idea that imagines the right to abortion involves 
a special case of balanced interests: on the one hand, of course, there is the 
pregnant woman’s autonomous choice, including choices that can involve her 
own life or health and death, and on the other hand, there is the State’s interest 
in fetal life—life that is sometimes at stake depending partly on a pregnant 
woman’s choice. But if the abortion right is thought to be unique because it 
implicates a tradeoff of life of different sorts, or, depending on one’s view, lives 
of the same sort, the case for abortion’s uniqueness dissipates. On closer 
inspection, a range of constitutional rights involve tradeoffs where nothing less 
than human life is at stake.114 The easiest case in which to see this might be the 
Second Amendment,115 but other rights, like aspects of the right to die that are 
already protected, do, too.116 It is partly for this reason that a ruling upholding 
                                                                                                                     
jurisprudence. In no way is it meant to endorse an uncritical view on it, on which, still see 
Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation 
of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1995) (describing as “jurisprudential error” the 
way that “sexual equality jurisprudence has uncritically accepted the validity of biological 
sexual differences” when they are, with respect to “almost every claim [about] sexual 
identity or sex discrimination[,] . . . grounded in normative gender rules and roles”). 
 114 For a general discussion of what she calls “tragic rights,” see Robin L. West, Tragic 
Rights: The Rights Critique in the Age of Obama, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 713 (2011). 
 115 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008) (holding that the Second 
Amendment protects a right to own a handgun for purposes of self-defense in the home); 
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010) (holding that Heller’s rule applies 
to the States).  
 116 See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990). This right to 
refuse unwanted medical treatment, including lifesaving artificial nutrition and hydration, 
which encompasses a right to passive euthanasia, has been subject to bids for expansion, so 
far not recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court, Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 
(1997), and Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997), partly on the grounds of the effects of the 
life tradeoffs that allowing active forms of euthanasia might take. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 
at 731–32 (discussing “the State . . . interest in protecting vulnerable groups—including the 
poor, the elderly, and disabled persons—from abuse, neglect, and mistakes,” and noting that 
this interest “goes beyond protecting the vulnerable from coercion,” to include “protecting 
disabled and terminally ill people from prejudice, negative and inaccurate stereotypes, and 
‘societal indifference,’” reasoning that the State’s ban on assisted suicide “reflects and 
reinforces its policy that the lives of terminally ill, disabled, and elderly people must be no 
less valued than the lives of the young and healthy” (citation omitted)). But, of course, those 
same life tradeoffs may arise in the context of the right to die achieved through passive 
means. Just so, Cruzan did not imagine that those prospects could justify limiting or 
conditioning the right that it recognized. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278–87. Similarly, the Ninth 
Circuit’s en banc decision in Compassion in Dying v. Washington, written by Judge Stephen 
Reinhardt, vigorously rejected the equality claims against recognizing a constitutional right 
to active euthanasia in the course of announcing such a right. Compassion in Dying v. 
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H.B. 214 might well be the starting point for a larger reworking of the very 
tradition of individual rights from which the abortion right emerges and that has 
long been a point of tremendous national pride within our constitutional system, 
which has treated it as axiomatic that individual constitutional rights, to their 
very definition, imply a certain sphere, perhaps not wholly unlimited, of 
ultimate freedom from State inquiry and accountability in their exercise. 
Whether this tradition is a function of “the nature” of rights themselves or not, 
anyone who cares about any of the individual rights that our constitutional 
system protects might find themselves pausing to consider the potential for a 
precedent upholding H.B. 214 against constitutional challenge to pave the way 
to decision-based limitations on other constitutional rights. The patent 
inconsistency of this prospect with the constitutional rules governing 
previability abortion decisions is enough reason for the moment to think that 
H.B. 214 should be struck down. 
B. Postviability Application of H.B. 214 
This still leaves the constitutionality of H.B. 214’s postviability applications 
to consider.  
To begin, recall the general idea of the law governing this area is that the 
State may, from and after the point of fetal viability, regulate and even prohibit 
abortions outright subject to the provision for express exceptions in individual 
cases in which an abortion is needed in order to protect or preserve a pregnant 
woman’s life or health.117 When considering H.B. 214, and particularly its 
postviability applications, no one should forget that the State of Ohio already 
outlaws all postviability abortions precisely as such,118 and that it additionally 
bars abortions from and after the earlier point in time “when the probable 
post-fertilization age of the [fetus] is twenty weeks or greater,”119 technically, a 
previability and postviability abortion ban.120 (Though it has not so far been 
                                                                                                                     
Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 793–94, 825–27 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc). Practically in this sense, 
both Cruzan and Compassion in Dying indicate that whatever life tradeoffs might result from 
recognizing that individuals have a constitutional right to end their lives with a doctor’s help 
are tradeoffs that the Constitution requires be made. 
 117 See generally supra Part III (discussing aspects of governing constitutional doctrine). 
 118 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.201(A) (West, Westlaw through File 51 of 132d 
Gen. Assemb. (2017–2018)). This rule requires that “[n]o person shall purposely perform or 
induce or attempt to perform or induce an abortion on a pregnant woman when the unborn 
child is viable.” Id. § 2919.17(A).  
 119 Id. § 2919.18; see also infra notes 121, 141 and accompanying text. 
 120 Ohio law also prohibits the procedure sometimes referred to as “dilation and 
extraction” or “D&X.” See generally Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 136 (2007) (“The 
abortion procedure that was the impetus for the numerous bans on ‘partial-birth 
abortion[]’ . . . is a variation of this standard D&E [dilation and evacuation]. . . . The medical 
community has not reached unanimity on the appropriate name for this D&E variation. It 
has been referred to as ‘intact D&E,’ ‘dilation and extraction’ (D&X), and ‘intact D&X.’” 
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challenged in court, the previability functioning of the 20-week-on abortion ban 
is inconsistent with existing constitutional rules.121) This basic pattern of 
existing abortion law in Ohio, with its multi-layered, postviability abortion 
prohibitions will become relevant momentarily. 
Taken on its own terms, H.B. 214’s failure to provide any exception for 
abortions needed to protect or preserve maternal life and health is fatal to it in 
constitutional terms. This is true, as already discussed, in relation to H.B. 214’s 
previability applications,122 and it is equally true of H.B. 214’s postviability 
operations. Even when the State’s authority to regulate abortion is at its 
constitutional high point, as it is after fetal viability, the State may still not force 
a pregnant woman to carry a pregnancy to term in the interests of protecting and 
preserving the (potential) life of the fetus when doing so would imperil her own 
life or her health.123 H.B. 214, by its own language, does and would require 
exactly that. 
This is the most obvious, but not the only, constitutional flaw of H.B. 214’s 
postviability applications. Another set of constitutional shortcomings of the 
legislation deserves mention and engagement.  
The overarching concern at work here might have been quickly registered 
in the era in which Roe v. Wade governed abortion rights. At that time, a 
woman’s abortion rights were protected as a function of the “fundamental” 
constitutional “right to privacy.”124 Standard doctrine at the time Roe was 
decided indicated that regulations, including prohibitions, on the exercise of 
fundamental constitutional rights like the right to privacy triggered the highest 
and most stringent form of judicial examination: strict scrutiny.125 
                                                                                                                     
(citations omitted)). This ban, which appears as OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.151(A)–(D) 
(defining “partial birth feticide”), has both previability and postviability applications. For 
more on its legal status, see supra note 66. 
 121 See, e.g., Isaacson v. Horne, 716 F.3d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied 134 
S. Ct. 905 (2014) (mem.); Jane L. v. Bangerter, 102 F.3d 1112, 1116–18 (10th Cir. 1996).  
 122 See supra text accompanying notes 105–10. 
 123 See supra notes 45–52 and accompanying text (discussing the life and health 
exceptions required for postviability State regulations, including bans, on abortion). 
 124 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 169–70 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“[I]n Eisenstadt 
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 [(1972)], we recognized ‘the right of the individual, married or 
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally 
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.’ That right necessarily 
includes the right of a woman to decide whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”). 
 125 Justice William O. Douglas’s concurrence in Doe v. Bolton expressed an important 
aspect of this framing thus:  
[W]here fundamental personal rights and liberties are involved, the corrective 
legislation must be ‘narrowly drawn to prevent the supposed evil,’ Cantwell v. 
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307, and not be dealt with in an ‘unlimited and 
indiscriminate’ manner. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 490. And see Talley v. 
California, 362 U.S. 60. Unless regulatory measures are so confined and are addressed 
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Conventionally, this aggressive mode of judicial review at the time of Roe 
provided (and still does) that a State-imposed limit on the exercise of a 
fundamental right must be supported by a “compelling” governmental 
interest.126 It also required (and still does) that a State limitation on a 
fundamental right be drawn very carefully, as narrowly as possible, so as to 
ensure that the State’s reason for enacting a particular rights-constricting 
measure is precisely served by the measure that the State has finally enacted. 
Hence the well-known name for strict scrutiny’s precise “fit” requirement 
between legislative means and ends: “narrow tailoring.”127 
In keeping with these conventional terms for analyzing State-imposed 
regulatory burdens on fundamental rights, Roe invoked the strict scrutiny test, 
including both its demand that the State come forward with a compelling 
justification when it infringes a fundamental right and the test’s demand for 
narrow tailoring.128 But while Roe followed a strict scrutiny framework in 
important respects as to first-trimester abortions, where no regulations of 
abortion were allowed,129 it also—in some notable ways—departed from it. Soft 
pedaling the point, Roe effectively announced that, at least in certain instances 
involving abortion and abortion regulations outside the first trimester of 
pregnancy, the strict scrutiny test’s “compelling governmental interest” 
requirement would remain fully in force, while its “narrow tailoring” 
requirement would be somewhat relaxed, replaced by a constitutional 
                                                                                                                     
to the specific areas of compelling legislative concern, the police power would become 
the great leveler of constitutional rights and liberties. 
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 216 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (first quoting Cantwell v. 
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307 (1940); then citing Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 490 
(1960); and then citing Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960)). Having articulated this 
standard of review, the opinion proceeds to apply it. Id. at 216–21. 
 126 Roe, 410 U.S. at 155–56 (“Where certain ‘fundamental rights’ are involved, the 
Court has held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a ‘compelling 
state interest,’ and that legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the 
legitimate state interests at stake. . . . In the recent abortion cases, cited above, courts have 
recognized these principles.” (citations omitted)). 
 127 See id.; see also supra note 125.  
 128 Roe, 410 U.S. at 155–56 (“Where certain ‘fundamental rights’ are involved, the 
Court has held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a ‘compelling 
state interest,’ and that legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the 
legitimate state interests at stake. . . . In the recent abortion cases, cited above, courts have 
recognized these principles.” (citations omitted)). For further discussion relevant to the point 
in Roe, see id. at 153–55, 162–64. 
 129 Id. at 163 (observing that, prior to the end of the first trimester, “the attending 
physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to determine, without regulation by the 
State, that, in his medical judgment, the patient’s pregnancy should be terminated,” and 
going on to add, “[i]f that decision is reached, the judgment may be effectuated by an 
abortion free of interference by the State”); see also id. at 164 (“For the stage prior to 
approximately the end of the first trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must 
be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s attending physician.”). 
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assessment of whether the fit between the governmental interest and its 
regulatory end was a “reasonable” one.130 To be sure, a “reasonable” fit is not 
necessarily a “narrow” one sufficient to comply with the standard demands of 
“narrow tailoring,” but from all indications the reasonable fit requirement that 
Roe deployed outside the first trimester functioned much the way as the more 
stringent narrow tailoring analytics ordinarily did and do. A reasonable fit 
requirement in this setting practically ensured that a State’s regulatory intrusion 
on a constitutionally protected choice would extend no further than the State’s 
reasons for it, carefully articulated and parsed, properly called for and justified. 
What is more, the reasonable fit requirement was also capable of serving a 
                                                                                                                     
 130 Id. at 163 (holding that the State is permitted to regulate abortion after first trimester 
of pregnancy “to the extent that the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation and 
protection of maternal health”); id. at 164 (noting that after “approximately the end of the 
first trimester, the State, in promoting its interest in the health of the mother, may, if it 
chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal 
health.”); see also Doe, 410 U.S. at 194–95 (“This is not to say that Georgia may 
not . . . , from and after the end of the first trimester, adopt standards for licensing all 
facilities where abortions may be performed so long as those standards are legitimately 
related to the objective the State seeks to accomplish.”). While there is no similar language 
in Roe’s discussion of the third trimester and the State’s interest in protecting the potential 
life of the fetus, see, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 164–65 (summarizing third-trimester rules without 
any discussion of a reasonable fit requirement), there is relevant discussion of tailoring that 
applies to the third trimester. Id. at 165 (“The decision leaves the State free to place 
increasing restrictions on abortion as the period of pregnancy lengthens, so long as those 
restrictions are tailored to the recognized state interests.”); cf. Planned Parenthood Ass’n of 
Kan. City, Mo., Inc., v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 499 (1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (“But regulations governing postviability abortions, like those at any 
other stage of pregnancy, must be ‘tailored to the recognized state interests.’” (citing Roe, 
410 U.S. at 165)). In any case, language similar to Roe’s treatment of the State’s interest in 
preserving and protecting maternal health and its engagement with a reasonable fit 
requirement is found in operation in Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Kansas City, Missouri, 
Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 486 (1983) (Powell, J., writing for himself and joined by Burger, 
C.J.), where the lead opinion by Justice Powell, following City of Akron v. Akron Center for 
Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 434 (1983), applies a “reasonable fit” requirement 
both with respect to second-trimester and third-trimester abortions. Planned Parenthood 
Ass’n of Kan. City, Mo., 462 U.S. at 481–82 (majority opinion) (second-trimester abortion); 
id. at 486 (Powell, J., writing for himself and joined by Burger, C.J.) (holding second-
physician requirement for third-trimester abortions “reasonably furthers the State’s 
compelling interest in protecting the lives of viable fetuses” (emphasis added)). Worth 
adding at this juncture is that the thought and intuition being offered and explored in the text 
are not meant as any kind of retrospective predictions about how the fundamental right to 
abortion recognized by Roe would have conditioned a Supreme Court analysis of a third-
trimester abortion restriction such as the postviability operations of H.B. 214. Nor, for that 
matter, does the text seek to offer an analysis of H.B. 214 according to the rule of Roe. 
Rather, the thought and intuition being offered and explored in the text are invoking Roe and 
its approach to a “reasonable fit” analysis as a conceptual device that is designed to capture 
and illuminate an intuition about how H.B. 214, even postviability, does not, finally, square 
with the constitutional values at work in the abortion rights setting. 
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related function that the narrow tailoring requirement, for its part, can and does 
serve: as a device for determining whether the reasons that a State has proffered 
in support of a particular abortion regulation being challenged are the “real,” 
meaning constitutionally creditable, reasons for the State’s rule.  
What does H.B. 214 look like within this sort of analytic framework? In 
defense of H.B. 214, the State could and almost certainly would claim that H.B. 
214 restricts postviability abortions of fetuses actually or possibly with Down 
syndrome as a means of protecting and preserving fetal life. Since Roe, after 
viability, this State interest has been recognized as compelling in the relevant 
constitutional sense.131 It is thus plainly capable of satisfying strict scrutiny’s 
powerful State interest requirement.132 Considering H.B. 214, there is another 
State interest that may be thought to be in play, judging from arguments that 
sponsors and supporters of H.B. 214 and its twin measure in the State 
legislature, Senate Bill 164 (S.B. 164),133 made during the course of legislative 
proceedings on the bills. Not itself yet recognized as part of the Supreme Court’s 
abortion jurisprudence, which has widely been thought to have defined all the 
possible State interests implicated by abortion rights, the State might well offer 
as a defense of H.B. 214 that it seeks to declare and vindicate an equality norm, 
perhaps, to give it, however provisionally, a more concrete mode of expression, 
something like the equal dignity and worth of people with Down syndrome.134 
Although there is some important overlap between them and argument to be 
ventured against their independence of terms, each of the State’s interests will 
be considered separately in turn, starting with the question of their constitutional 
strengths, followed by a discussion of the reasonableness of the fit between these 
reasons for H.B. 214 and what the measure does.  
1. The State’s Interest in Protecting and Preserving Fetal Life 
The State’s interest in protecting and preserving fetal life is broad. It has 
repeatedly and consistently been understood by the Supreme Court to be a 
compelling State interest from and after the point of fetal viability, capable of 
justifying regulations of abortion, indeed, wholesale abortion bans, except 
where an abortion is needed to protect or preserve a pregnant woman’s life or 
health.135 The doctrinal persistence of this State interest and the broad terms in 
                                                                                                                     
 131 Roe, 410 U.S. at 163 (“With respect to the State’s important and legitimate interest 
in potential life, the ‘compelling’ point is at viability.”). 
 132 Id. 
 133 S. 164, 132d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2017) (as passed by the Senate, Nov. 
15, 2017). 
 134 For further discussion of some of the different ways this interest was discussed during 
the legislative deliberations on H.B. 214 and its Senate twin, S.B. 164, and how it might be 
characterized for purposes of a State-interest-and-fit analysis, see, for example, infra Part 
IV.B.2.  
 135 See supra notes 45–52 and accompanying text (discussing the State’s interest in 
protecting and preserving fetal life and the life and health exceptions needed for postviability 
abortion regulations, including wholesale bans on the practice). 
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which the Supreme Court has discussed it since the time of Roe have led many 
who have studied the Supreme Court’s abortion decisions, no matter where they 
stand on them (for, against, or somewhere else), to suppose that the State, after 
the point of fetal viability, is at liberty to regulate and prohibit abortions any 
way it might like, subject only to the required exception for individual cases 
involving a pregnant woman’s life or health. 
Surprising as this might sound, then, on closer consideration, the State’s 
broad authority to regulate abortions postviability may actually rest on ground 
that is somewhat less solid than is ordinarily supposed. The importance and 
breadth of the State’s interests in the (potential) life of the fetus postviability is 
beyond cavil, but that, as must now be clear, is not the only item of constitutional 
concern. Related to it is the matter of fit: how reasonably the State has gone 
about advancing its interest.  
With respect to H.B. 214, the relevant inquiry is how reasonably does this 
law’s Down syndrome abortion ban advance the State’s interest, compelling 
after viability, in protecting and preserving fetal life? 
This question cannot be settled by simple reference to hard science, nor can 
it be resolved by appeal to objective truth or legal, including logical, necessity 
to the strictest degree. “Reasonableness” here, as elsewhere in constitutional 
law, is a highly situated judgment. Ideally, it is rationally informed, if not 
mathematically governed, by the complex, competing considerations of 
constitutionally grounded values and interests found in an area of law governing 
an aspect of social and political life. In the abortion setting, the range of relevant 
values and interests are varied, profound, highly contentious, and regularly seen 
as conflicting, because, among other things, of the widely divergent worldviews 
reflected within the Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence. The 
interpretations of the Constitution found in various abortion rights opinions span 
a remarkable range of understandings of how this basic charter of government 
and of rights is best understood to speak to the existence of a pregnant woman’s 
abortion right and what sorts of State interests are sufficient to overcome and 
outweigh it and when, how, and why. 
Given this complex matrix of values and interests and how they have been 
given constitutional grounding and expression, and in particular, how they have 
generally been worked out in relation to the State’s authority to regulate abortion 
after the point of fetal viability, it is no great challenge to imagine that an 
engagement with the relevant abortion rights case law could lead to the 
conclusion that H.B. 214 reasonably advances the State’s compelling interest in 
protecting and preserving fetal life. Here is one way to give that conclusion some 
rational exposition. Looking at the text of H.B. 214, the law plainly prohibits a 
class of abortions in a way that is designed to save fetuses with or that may have 
Down syndrome from abortion.136 In this sense, it may be thought reasonably 
                                                                                                                     
 136 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE § 2919.10(B) (West, Westlaw through File 51 of 132d 
Gen. Assemb. (2017–2018)). 
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to score an advance for what, postviability, is the compelling State end of 
protecting and preserving fetal life. 
Recognizing the conceptual plausibility of this account, another perspective 
on H.B. 214’s reasonableness as a means of protecting and preserving 
postviability fetal life presents itself. The strength of this alternative perspective 
in comparative terms is a variation on a traditional condition of theoretical 
preferability among ethical theories based on considerations of “complete[ness] 
and comprehensive[ness].”137 Compared to the H.B. 214-favorable account 
holding that H.B. 214 reasonably advances the State’s interest in protecting and 
preserving postviability fetal life, this version of reasonableness reflects and 
encompasses a larger array of contingent facts of the matter on the ground.138 
In this sense, it is the more reasonable reasonableness account. 
The case for this view of H.B. 214 begins by noticing the pattern of existing 
positive law in Ohio as the legal fabric against which H.B. 214 was enacted and 
of which it is now a part. For some time before H.B. 214 was passed and signed 
into law, the State of Ohio had expressed its interest in protecting and preserving 
fetal life numerous times and in numerous ways over the course of numerous 
years.139 Speaking of laws that occupy postviaiblity abortion space, the State’s 
                                                                                                                     
 137 TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 339 
(5th ed. 2001) (“A theory should be as complete and comprehensive as possible.”).  
 138 It might be noted that there is a certain family relationship between this approach and 
Carl Schneider’s complaint that, in the Supreme Court’s privacy cases, “the Court often 
looks at the challenged statute in isolation from its legal and social context and often looks 
at the challenged statute in isolation from other statutes and from other forms of social 
regulation.” Carl E. Schneider, State-Interest Analysis and the Channeling Function in 
Privacy Law, in PUBLIC VALUES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 97, 97 (Stephen E. Gottlieb ed., 
1993) (quoting Carl E. Schneider, State-Interest Analysis in Fourteenth Amendment 
‘Privacy’ Law: An Essay on the Constitutionalization of Social Issues, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 79, 97 (1988)). The approach in the text, like Schneider’s but different in its 
orientation, does not regard this as an ineluctable fact. 
 139 Some of these measures, broadly understood as implicating the State’s interest in 
protecting and preserving fetal life, have reached and been decided by the Supreme Court. 
See, e.g., Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502, 518–20 (1990) (holding 
that parental notice requirement was constitutional where statute contained, inter alia, an 
emergency exception); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health (Akron I), 462 
U.S. 416, 452 (1983) (invalidating sections of city’s abortion regulation that required 
“parental consent, informed consent, a 24-hour waiting period, [a particular mode for] 
disposal of fetal remains[, and] that all second-trimester abortions be performed in a 
hospital”), overruled in part by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882–
83 (1992) (plurality opinion) (overruling Akron I with respect to informed consent 
requirements); see also Voinovich v. Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp., 523 U.S. 1036, 1037 
(1998) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). For some additional discussion, see 
Spindelman, supra note 51, at 184–85 (discussing David Forte’s proud invocation of efforts 
in Ohio to restrict abortion as mechanisms to challenge and cut back on Roe v. Wade). The 
positive law rules in the cases that have reached the Supreme Court are hardly the only means 
by which the State has over the years since Roe sought to advance its interest in protecting 
and preserving fetal life. 
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expression of concern for prenatal but postviability life presently and 
prominently includes the law that expressly forbids all postviability abortions to 
the maximum extent allowed by the Federal Constitution.140 Additionally, in the 
near-postviability and postviability spaces, Ohio law also currently bans any 
abortion “when the probable post-fertilization age of the unborn child is twenty 
weeks or greater,”141 an abortion ban that, like the State’s basic postviability 
abortion prohibition, seeks to occupy the maximum extent allowed by federal 
constitutional law. These two wall-to-wall abortion prohibitions, which overlap 
in the postviability abortion domain, making all postviability abortions not 
singly but doubly prohibited, define important attributes of the legal backdrop 
against which H.B. 214 was enacted and against which its reasonableness as a 
                                                                                                                     
 140 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.17(A) (West, Westlaw through File 51 of 132d 
Gen. Assemb. (2017–2018)). This rule requires that “[n]o person shall purposely perform or 
induce or attempt to perform or induce an abortion on a pregnant woman when the unborn 
child is viable.” Id. It contains an exception for abortions needed to protect and preserve a 
pregnant woman’s life and some aspects of a pregnant woman’s health. Id. 
§ 2919.17(B)(1)(b) (making it an affirmative defense to the rule against postviability 
abortion to perform the abortion when “[t]he abortion was necessary to prevent the death of 
the pregnant woman or a serious risk of the substantial and irreversible impairment of a major 
bodily function of the pregnant woman”); see also id. § 2919.16(K) (“A medically diagnosed 
condition that constitutes a ‘serious risk of the substantial and irreversible impairment of a 
major bodily function’ . . . does not include a condition related to the woman’s mental 
health.”). Although this postviability abortion ban does not recognize the full scope of 
constitutional protections for a pregnant woman’s decision to end a pregnancy after viability 
where doing so is necessary to protect or preserve her own life or health, including 
psychological health, id., the measure may be described as seeking to ban postviability 
abortions to the maximum extent allowed by existing constitutional doctrine. This anyway 
in light of Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania. v. Casey, 505 U.S. at 879–80 
(affirming the court of appeals’ interpretation of the State’s anti-abortion law at issue in the 
case, which contained, among other things, language that, on a plain reading of it, would 
have been an overly narrow, and hence an unconstitutional, exception for a pregnant 
woman’s life or health). Candidly, it is hard to see how a court could properly read Ohio’s 
postviability abortion ban’s maternal-life-and-health exception to conform with existing 
rules about the scope of that exception required by the Federal Constitution. 
 141 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.201(A). This ban creates an exception from its rule 
for abortions that are needed to protect and preserve a pregnant woman’s life or health, id. 
§ 2919.201(B)(1)(a)–(b) (making it an affirmative defense to the rule against performing an 
abortion after “[t]he probable post-fertilization age of the unborn child [is twenty weeks or 
greater]” where “[t]he abortion was necessary to prevent the death of the pregnant woman 
or a serious risk of the substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function of 
the pregnant woman”), but health, by text, is defined not to be “based on any reason related 
to the woman’s mental health.” Id. § 2919.201(B)(2). Although this abortion ban does not 
affirm the life-and-health exception that the Supreme Court’s case law requires to its fullest 
extent, it may anyway be read as seeking to assert the State’s maximum authority to regulate 
and prohibit abortions allowed by law. The additional caveats about the State’s postviability 
abortion ban mentioned in supra note 140, apply here, as does the earlier observation about 
this measure’s impermissibility in its previability operations under existing abortion 
precedent. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
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measure also aiming to vindicate the State’s interest in protecting and preserving 
fetal life is to be considered.142 
With this picture of postviability abortion space in view, the question about 
H.B. 214’s reasonableness as a measure that aims to protect and preserve fetal 
life is whether there is any actual need for this law and the postviability abortion 
prohibition it entails. Given the State’s multi-layered bans on postviability 
abortions, is there any reason to believe H.B. 214 is required? Is there any 
evidence that postviability fetuses with or that may have Down syndrome are 
being distinctively threatened in a way that State law, without H.B. 214, cannot 
adequately handle? Are fetuses with or that may have Down syndrome being 
aborted after viability notwithstanding the State’s multi-layered prohibitory net, 
hence in ways that call out for H.B. 214’s distinctive protections? 
Sponsor testimony on H.B. 214 offered by Representative Sarah LaTourette 
and sponsor testimony offered on H.B. 214’s Senate twin, S.B. 164, by Senator 
Frank LaRose highlighted what they understood to be the percentage of 
abortions of fetuses after pregnant women are given a Down syndrome 
diagnosis. The benchmark figure that both Representative LaTourette and 
Senator LaRose cited was “nearly,” “around,” or “up to” “90%.”143 The 
underlying authority for this statistic, referred to by Senator LaRose’s 
                                                                                                                     
 142 Making the point this way in no way means to forget that Ohio law also prohibits the 
abortion procedure sometimes referred to as “dilation and extraction” or “D&X,” on which 
see supra note 120, which appears as OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.151 (defining “partial 
birth feticide”). (More on its legal status is in supra note 66.) It is rather to be somewhat 
conservative about the argument being advanced at this point in the text. 
 143 LaTourette H.R. 214 Testimony: H. Health Comm., supra note 23, at 1 (“Upon 
receiving a potential diagnosis of Down syndrome for their unborn child, nearly 90% of 
women choose abortion. Substitute House Bill 552 from the 130th General Assembly sought 
to address this alarming statistic. The Down Syndrome Information Act requires medical 
professionals to distribute up-to-date, evidence-based information on Down syndrome to 
parents who receive the diagnosis, either prenatally or after birth.”); Hearing on S. 164 
Before the S. Health, Human Servs. & Medicaid Comm., 132d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 
(Ohio 2017–2018) (statement of Sen. Frank LaRose at 1) [hereinafter LaRose Testimony] 
(“Currently around 90% of unborn babies in the U.S. that receive a pre-natal diagnosis of 
Down syndrome are aborted.” (citing Amy Harmon, Prenatal Testing Puts Down Syndrome 
in Hard Focus, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/09/us/09down. 
html)); Ohio House of Representatives, 132d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., Floor Debate on 
H.R. 214: 11-1-2017, OHIO CHANNEL, at 0:27:00 (Ohio 2017–2018), 
http://www.ohiohouse.gov/session/session-video-library (click on “House of Representatives–
11-1-2017”) [hereinafter Floor Debate on H.R. 214: 11-1-2017] (statement of Rep. Sarah 
LaTourette) (“I first decided to carry this legislation during the last General Assembly upon 
hearing the statistic that up to 90% of women choose abortion when receiving this potential 
diagnosis for their unborn child. 90%.”). 
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testimony,144 is a decade-old New York Times story,145 which itself referred to 
a systematic literature review from 1999, the data of which have now been 
superseded by a more recent “systematic review of termination rates.”146 That 
                                                                                                                     
 144 LaRose Testimony, supra note 143, at 1 & n.1. Although Representative LaTourette’s 
written testimony mentions the same 90% figure that Senator LaRose’s does, neither her 
testimony on the bill before the House Health Committee, LaTourette H.R. 214 Testimony: 
H. Health Comm., supra note 23, at 1 (claiming that “[u]pon receiving a potential diagnosis 
of Down syndrome for their unborn child, nearly 90% of women choose abortion,” but citing 
no authority for the “nearly 90%” figure), nor her testimony on the bill before the Senate 
Health, Human Services and Medicaid Committee, Hearing on H.R. 214 Before the 
S. Health, Human Servs. & Medicaid Comm., 132d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 1 (Ohio 2017–
2018) (statement of Rep. Sarah LaTourette) (claiming again that “[u]pon receiving a 
potential diagnosis of Down syndrome for their unborn child, nearly 90% of women choose 
abortion,” but citing no authority for the “nearly 90%” figure), nor her statement during the 
floor debate over H.B. 214 in the Ohio House of Representatives, Floor Debate on H.R. 214: 
11-1-2017, supra note 143, at 0:27:00 (statement of Rep. Sarah LaTourette) (noting “I first 
decided to carry this legislation during the last General Assembly upon hearing the statistic 
that up to 90% of women choose abortion when receiving this potential diagnosis for their 
unborn child. 90%,” but again citing no authority for the “up to 90%” figure), offers any 
authority for the statistic. The same holds for Representative LaTourette’s testimony on H.B. 
135. Hearing on H.R. 135 Before the H. Cmty. & Family Advancement Comm., 131st Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2015–2016) (statement of Rep. Sarah LaTourette at 1) 
[hereinafter LaTourette H.R. 135 Testimony: H. Cmty. & Family Advancement Comm.] 
(claiming that “[u]pon receiving a potential diagnosis of Down syndrome for their unborn 
child, up to 90% of women choose abortion,” but citing no authority for the “up to 90%” 
figure). 
 145 Harmon, supra note 143. 
 146 Jaime L. Natoli et al., Prenatal Diagnosis of Down Syndrome: A Systematic Review 
of Termination Rates (1995–2011), 32 PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 142, 142 (2012)). Testimony 
offered by Dr. Dennis M. Sullivan to the Ohio House Health Committee on H.B. 214 cited 
to this more recent systematic review of termination rates. Hearing on H.R. 214 Before the 
H. Health Comm., 132d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2017–2018) (statement of Dennis 
M. Sullivan, MD, MA (Ethics), FACS, Professor of Pharmacy Practice, Director, Center for 
Bioethics, Cedarville University at 4 & 6 n.2) [hereinafter Sullivan Testimony]. The results 
of this newer systematic review of termination rates, described as “the largest synthesis of 
United States data on termination rates following a prenatal diagnosis of Down syndrome,” 
Natoli et al., supra, at 142, were summarized by the review’s coauthors as follows:  
Twenty-four studies were accepted. The weighted mean termination rate was 67% 
(range: 61%–93%) among seven population-based studies, 85% (range: 60%–90%) 
among nine hospital-based studies, and 50% (range: 0%–100%) among eight anomaly-
based studies. Evidence suggests that termination rates have decreased in recent years. 
Termination rates also varied with maternal age, gestational age, and maternal 
race/ethnicity. 
Id. As the systematic review notes, “[t]he estimated termination rates following a prenatal 
diagnosis of Down syndrome presented in this review are appreciably lower than the 92% 
termination rate determined by Mansfield et al.” Id. at 150; see also id. at 142 (“Evidence 
suggests that termination rates are lower than noted in a previous review that was based on 
less contemporary studies and had an international focus.”). The “Mansfield et al.” study 
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detail aside, nothing that Representative LaTourette or Senator LaRose said in 
support of their bills indicated with clarity that postviability fetuses with or that 
may have Down syndrome faced any kind of distinctive threat compared to 
other postviability fetuses.147 More broadly, if also conservatively, a review of 
the public legislative deliberations over H.B. 214 and its twin, S.B. 164, 
including written testimony submitted to the relevant committees and the video 
of the floor debates on the measures, indicates that discussions about them did 
not focus in any meaningful way on the need for them as postviability abortion 
bans. Nowhere in the public legislative deliberations as just described was the 
case ever squarely and prominently made that the State’s current postviability 
abortion prohibitions were inadequate to the task of safeguarding the lives of all 
postviability fetuses, including fetuses with or that might have Down syndrome. 
No argument highlighted the need for H.B. 214 as a measure that was required 
in excess of the current postviability abortion bans in order to protect and 
preserve the lives of postviability fetuses that have or might have Down 
syndrome. 
So, is there any issue of Down-syndrome-selective abortions after fetal 
viability that the State might see a concrete need to contend with as through 
H.B. 214? Perhaps, but if there is, it seems less likely to be found in the general 
field of postviability abortions, which the State multiply disallows, than within 
                                                                                                                     
referred to is Caroline Mansfield et al., Termination Rates After Prenatal Diagnosis of Down 
Syndrome, Spina Bifida, Anencephaly, and Turner and Klinefelter Syndromes: A Systematic 
Literature Review, 19 PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 808, 809–10 (1999), the same study referred to 
by the New York Times article cited by Senator LaRose’s S.B. 164 testimony. LaRose 
Testimony, supra note 143, at 1. As the authors of the more recent systematic review note, 
although the Mansfield et al. study “is frequently referenced, its applicability to the current 
US population is unclear.” Natoli et al., supra, at 142. Natoli and her coauthors also discuss 
important limitations on their own systematic review in id. at 151–52. 
 147 Nothing in the New York Times story nor the review of termination rates by Mansfield 
et al. prominently breaks them down by trimester. Indeed, only some of the underlying 
studies that the Mansfield et al. work surveyed were even from the United States. See 
Mansfield et al., supra note 146, at 809 (noting that of the “20 papers . . . [that] met the 
inclusion criteria . . . these papers included 37 data sets from 11 different countries”); Natoli 
et al., supra note 146, at 142 (noting that, of the studies cited in Mansfield et al., 
“three . . . were from the United States, [but] comprised only 77 of the 5035 patients (1.5%) 
in the analysis”). Although there is, by contrast, some disaggregation of termination rates by 
trimester in the work by Natoli et al., see, e.g., id. at 149 tbl.5, considerations of various 
sorts—including the reasons pregnant women had or might have had for having a third-
trimester abortion, the medical status of the fetus that was aborted as a result of the pregnant 
woman’s decision, and variations of State law—make it difficult to draw any portable and 
firm conclusions about rates of third-trimester Down-syndrome-selective abortions that 
would speak to the practical need in Ohio for a law like H.B. 214. In any case, the 
undisaggregated 90% figure, which was actually a little higher than that in the Mansfield et 
al. review reported by the New York Times and cited by Senator LaRose, seemed to be the 
gross, relevant number that informed the legislative deliberations of H.B. 214 and its Senate 
twin, S.B. 164. 
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the constitutional safe harbor for postviability abortions where the abortion 
choice is still protected when the procedure is needed by the pregnant woman 
to safeguard her life or health. Almost conveniently, H.B. 214, which contains 
no exceptions for abortions indicated to protect or preserve maternal life or 
health, may be read as reflecting an awareness that some abortions undertaken 
to save a pregnant woman’s life or well-being may also be motivated to some 
degree by the actual or possible Down-syndrome status of the fetus. In this 
sense, H.B. 214’s exceptionless abortion prohibition, which is, as described 
above,148 unconstitutional for that reason, looks to be at least in part a bid that 
could occasion the rewriting of existing constitutional rules safeguarding 
maternal life and health throughout the course of pregnancy, including after fetal 
viability. 
To the extent that H.B. 214 enters, and by its terms seeks to govern, the 
postviability constitutional safe harbor for abortion choice in the name of 
protecting and preserving the life of fetuses actually or possibly with Down 
syndrome, the measure technically may advance the State’s interest in 
maintaining fetal life. But against the conclusion that this fit is both rational and 
reasonable is the unavoidable sense that the Supreme Court’s existing abortion 
jurisprudence frames a measure like H.B. 214 as one that, in regulating abortions 
needed to protect and preserve maternal life and health, goes too far in 
constitutional terms. The State’s interest in protecting and preserving fetal 
health, compelling as it is after viability, does not allow the State to regulate the 
safe harbor of postviability abortion choice. To the extent that H.B. 214 intrudes 
on a pregnant woman’s decision to end a pregnancy as a decision she makes to 
protect or preserve her own life and or health, the law is an unreasonable means 
of advancing the State’s interest in safeguarding fetal life postviability. “[T]he 
woman’s life and health must always prevail over the fetus’ life and health when 
they conflict.”149 
The same conclusion about reasonableness holds—albeit for a different set 
of reasons—in relation to H.B. 214’s ban on Down-syndrome-motivated 
abortions after viability in cases where maternal life or health is not at stake. 
This is because the State of Ohio has already banned all postviability abortions 
in their entirety through not one but two different measures.150 An additional 
                                                                                                                     
 148 See supra notes 105–10, 123 and accompanying text. 
 149 The quoted language is from Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 400 (1979). In 
context, it is a characterization of a statutory interpretation claim made in the case and not 
the Court’s own conclusion about it. Indeed, as the full sentence in which the quoted 
language appears explains: “The statute does not clearly specify, as appellants imply, that 
the woman’s life and health must always prevail over the fetus’ life and health when they 
conflict.” Id. 
 150 Once again, this is not to forget the State’s ban on so-called “partial birth abortion” 
or “dilation and extraction.” See supra notes 118–21 and accompanying text; see also supra 
notes 120, 142. It is once more to be somewhat conservative about the argument being made 
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postviability abortion ban like H.B. 214 is not, of course, categorically 
precluded simply because it is cumulative. Multiply criminalizing the same 
conduct is not, after all, an independent constitutional violation.151 But the 
reasonableness of H.B. 214 as a means of furthering the State’s end of protecting 
and preserving fetal life should be measured as a function of the concrete need 
for legislation doing what it does, substantiated, for instance, by an empirical 
demonstration that the State’s existing postviability prohibitions are inadequate 
to the task of protecting and preserving all postviability fetal life equally. 
Based on the testimony given in support of H.B. 214 and its Senate twin, 
S.B. 164, and hence the legislative record amassed in advance of floor debates 
on the bills, the Ohio legislature had no active reason to believe that the State’s 
existing postviability abortion bans—banning all abortions after fetal 
viability—are not working as they are meant to and that they are thus leaving 
fetuses that actually or possibly have Down syndrome underprotected by law 
and subject to differential treatment compared with all other fetuses safeguarded 
by the State’s existing abortion rules. Without such evidence, it might be true 
that H.B. 214 furthers the State’s interest in protecting and preserving fetal life 
in a general sense, but it does not do so reasonably in relevant constitutional 
terms. There is no reasonable basis for the way that H.B. 214 singles out fetuses 
with or that may have Down syndrome for the distinctive protections it provides 
postviability.152 
                                                                                                                     
in the text. If this measure were considered, too, it might make the need for H.B. 214 as a 
measure designed to protect and preserve postviability fetal life seem all the more attenuated. 
 151 See United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 746 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring in the 
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“To give the government broad control over the 
number of punishments that may be meted out for a single act . . . is consistent with the 
general rule that the government may punish as it chooses, within the bounds contained in 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.”); Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368–69 (1983) 
(“Where . . . a legislature specifically authorizes cumulative punishments under two statutes, 
regardless of whether those two statutes proscribe the ‘same’ conduct under Blockburger, a 
court’s task of statutory construction is at an end and the prosecutor may seek and the trial 
court or jury may impose cumulative punishment under such statutes in a single trial.” (citing 
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932)); id. at 370 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“A 
State has wide latitude to define crimes and to prescribe the punishment for a given crime. 
For example, a State is free to prescribe two different punishments (e.g., a fine and a prison 
term) for a single offense.”). Thanks to my colleague Alan Michaels for pointing me in the 
right direction here. 
 152 This point might also be relevant to any consideration of whether courts should 
narrow the existing constitutional safe harbor for postviability abortions required to protect 
and preserve a pregnant woman’s life or health undertaken in the context of Down-
syndrome-selective abortions. Any court deciding whether to alter existing postviability 
abortion rules should want to know whether the postviability safe harbor for choice is 
actually being used as a “cover” for “traffic” in what H.B. 214 would deem to be acts of anti-
Down-syndrome discrimination.  
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At this juncture, it seems important to note that the State—which carries a 
burden of constitutional justification in this setting153—has not so far taken the 
step of seeking to amass the kind of evidence that might speak to the concrete 
need for H.B. 214’s protections for fetuses with or that may have Down 
syndrome after fetal viability. If the State wished to, it presumably could, in 
conformity with existing constitutional abortion rules, try to collect data relevant 
to the question of whether fetuses that have or might have Down syndrome are 
being treated differently from all other postviability fetuses, both when maternal 
life and health are not at stake and also when they are. Speaking generally, the 
State presumably could constitutionally further its interest in protecting and 
preserving fetal life by requiring physicians asked to perform postviability 
abortions to inquire of their patients about their reasons for doing so as a data 
collection device. Depending on the results that obtained, some additional 
step—certainly an informed consent mechanism to provide pregnant women 
with truthful and nonmisleading information about Down syndrome and what it 
may be like to parent a child with Down syndrome—might, in keeping with the 
sorts of informed consent rules that are permitted prior to viability, be 
constitutionally allowed.154 What the evidence about Down-syndrome-selective 
abortions might have to look like in order legitimately to curtail pregnant 
women’s postviability abortion decisions and what sorts of restrictions, if any, 
would reasonably advance the State’s interest in fetal life need not presently be 
sorted out in advance. Even now, this much generally seems clear: Lacking any 
indication that fetuses with or that may have Down syndrome are inadequately 
being protected under existing State law rules, there is reason to suppose that 
H.B. 214 will not protect fetuses that actually or possibly have Down syndrome 
when all postviability abortions are already prohibited. In its ordinary 
postviability operations, H.B. 214 presently appears a form of regulatory surfeit, 
not a measure reasonably adapted to achieving what are otherwise 
constitutionally powerful ends. 
Just in case it is not clear enough, this analysis of the reasonableness—or, 
more exactly, the unreasonableness—of the fit between H.B. 214’s end of 
protecting and preserving fetal life and its means of doing so is highly 
contingent. It turns on the existence of the existing State bans on all postviability 
abortions and also on the absence of any case grounded in fact as they exist in 
                                                                                                                     
 153 This is consistent with the nature and structure of the right to terminate an unwanted 
pregnancy as, if not a fundamental right per Roe, see supra note 124, then a constitutionally 
protected liberty per Casey. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
869 (1992) (plurality opinion). 
 154 This might entail an expansion of the operation of Substitute House Bill 552 (H.B. 
552), the Down Syndrome Information Act. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.69 (West, 
Westlaw through File 51 of 132d Gen. Assemb. (2017–2018)) (codifying H.R. 552, 130th 
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2014)). Compare the terms and scope of H.B. 552 with the 
terms and scope of another informed consent measure discussed in Ziegler, supra note 58, 
at 613 & n.185 (discussing an informed consent measure that “Texas legislators proposed,” 
and collecting sources describing the measure). 
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Ohio (or elsewhere) that speaks to the need for a measure like H.B. 214 and its 
distinctive postviability protections for fetuses that actually or possibly have 
Down syndrome. Were any of these factors to change in a material way, a 
different conclusion on the reasonableness of H.B. 214 and its postviability 
operations might follow. Certainly, the calculus of reasonableness would be 
different than it presently is. 
2. The State’s Interest in Declaring and Vindicating the Equal Dignity 
and Worth of Persons with Down Syndrome 
What about the other State interest that H.B 214 may be said to advance? Is 
the State’s interest, once again to give it some initial expression, in declaring 
and vindicating the equal dignity and worth of persons with Down syndrome 
reasonably advanced by H.B. 214? 
As a threshold matter, this State interest has, of course, not yet been 
recognized by and within the Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence. And so 
it is worth flagging a constitutive feature of constitutional State interest analyses 
writ large. In the context of challenges to laws regulating individual 
constitutional rights, judicial analysis of relevant State interests contra—how 
these interests are articulated, their strength in constitutional terms, and how 
they are fitted to the State’s means of advancing them—are preeminently 
matters of constitutional policy-making, no matter how constrained, hence law-
like, the traditional standards of review through which they are processed are.155 
A State’s interest that is advanced in any given case and recognized by a court 
as legitimate, important, highly persuasive, or compelling, may be grounded in 
constitutional text or constitutionally informed values, but either way, the 
process of recognizing and assessing the strength of an asserted State interest 
and how carefully a legal rule that has been enacted furthers it is thoroughly 
normative. 
The initial question about the State’s equality interest in relation to fetuses 
with or that may have Down syndrome, implicated by H.B. 214, is how, 
precisely, the interest should be characterized, a variant of the level of generality 
problem most often associated with the articulation of individual constitutional 
rights.156  
                                                                                                                     
 155 One defense of this mode of constitutional policy-making points to its own structural 
constitutional underpinnings. See, e.g., Sandra Day O’Connor, Testing Government Action: 
The Promise of Federalism, in PUBLIC VALUES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 138, at 
35, 40 (“This grand [constitutional] design provides a reference point for examining 
constitutional conflicts. Above all, it highlights the importance of safeguarding personal 
liberties. . . . [T]he founders guarded against political excess by providing for inviolable 
individual rights. As the non-majoritarian branch, the judiciary ultimately must ensure that 
this bulwark, so carefully constructed, is maintained.”).  
 156 On that problem, see generally Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of 
Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057 (1990). For some live 
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As public deliberations on H.B. 214 and its Senate twin, S.B. 164, 
proceeded, sponsors and supporters of the measures variously discussed them 
in ways that, perhaps unremarkably given their shared text, focused intently and 
specifically on the condition of Down syndrome itself: its biological and 
population-based realities, its basis as a predicate for abortions, and how, in 
Iceland, Down-syndrome-selective abortions are functioning (this is the claim 
anyway) as a means to eliminate Down syndrome and persons with Down 
syndrome from the population as a whole.157 Testimony by sponsors and 
supporters of H.B. 214 and S.B. 164 also discussed abortion of fetuses with or 
that may have Down syndrome as a problem not exactly of anti-Down-
syndrome discrimination as such,158 but as a form of discrimination against 
                                                                                                                     
examples, see Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597–605 (2015); Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721–24 (1997); and Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 
n.6 (1989). 
 157 All these aspects of Down syndrome were discussed, for example, in the proponent 
testimony given by Dr. Dennis Sullivan on H.B. 214 to the Ohio Health Committee. Sullivan 
Testimony, supra note 146, at 3–4. Even in testimony favorable to H.B. 214 and S.B. 164 
that could be regarded as making a case for the distinctiveness of Down syndrome, 
arguments favoring the measure at times collapsed into arguments holding Down syndrome 
protections are disability protections. See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 214 Before the S. Health, 
Human Servs. & Medicaid Comm., 132d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2017–2018) 
(statement of Michael Gonidakis, President, Ohio Right to Life at 1–2) [hereinafter 
Gonidakis Testimony] (noting that Down syndrome is “the most common chromosomal 
disorder,” and that it “is not considered a severe disability,” but then going on to discuss “the 
use of prenatal screenings and invasive testing to diagnose potential health problems in 
unborn children” in a way that did not differentiate between Down syndrome and other 
disabilities); id. at 2 (“Abortions resulting from tests like these, which identify Down 
syndrome among many other disabilities, are discriminatory toward those with 
disabilities. . . . How contradictory this seems to be, in a time where our culture so highly 
values diversity and works so hard to promote acceptance of the marginalized members of 
our communities.”); id. (“In many circumstances, the United States prohibits discrimination 
against persons with Down syndrome, and the Americans with Disabilities Act . . . creates 
certain protections for Americans with disabilities like Down syndrome.”); id. (“How is it 
that we are so willing to make such accommodation for and to celebrate with the disabled 
among us, yet we so easily accept the arguments to end their lives before they are born? It is 
the worst form of discrimination to violently rob them of their opportunity even to live.”); 
see also LaTourette H.R. 214 Testimony: H. Health Comm., supra note 23, at 2–3 (discussing 
some of the distinctive features and realities of living with Down syndrome and then 
concluding with the observation that “this is not an issue about abortion—it is an issue of 
discrimination,” only finally to return focus back onto Down syndrome by saying that 
“[d]iscriminating against a person, not allowing them their God-given right to life, simply 
because they might have Down syndrome.”). 
 158 See Jim Siegel, Down Syndrome Abortion Ban Headed to Kasich, COLUMBUS 
DISPATCH (Dec. 13, 2017), http://www.dispatch.com/news/20171213/down-syndrome-abortion-
ban-headed-to-kasich [https://perma.cc/GB6M-U8VW] (quoting Mike Gonidakis, “executive 
director of Ohio Right to Life,” as saying, after the passage of H.B. 214 by the Ohio 
legislature that “[w]e are one step closer to ensuring that Ohioans with Down syndrome are 
recognized as humans worthy of dignity, just as they are.”).  
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persons with disabilities, where Down syndrome defined the scope of the subset 
of the larger class.159 More broadly still, testimony by sponsors and supporters 
of H.B. 214 and S.B. 164 variously described the measures, to quote Michael 
Gonidakis, the President of Ohio Right to Life, as seeking to advance, hence 
benefit, the interests of persons with Down syndrome as “marginalized members 
of our communities.”160 In light of these different characterizations, the initial 
                                                                                                                     
 159 See, e.g., LaRose Testimony, supra note 143, at 1 (“The life of a child with Down 
syndrome is not worth any less than the life [of] another child. This legislation will protect 
the lives of unborn children with disabilities and value them as equal members of society.”); 
see also, e.g., Gonidakis Testimony, supra note 157, at 1 (noting that Down syndrome “is 
not considered a severe disability”); id. at 2 (“Abortions resulting from tests like these, which 
identify Down syndrome among many other disabilities, are discriminatory toward those 
with disabilities.”); id. (“In many circumstances, the United States prohibits discrimination 
against persons with Down syndrome, and the Americans with Disabilities Act . . . creates 
certain protections for Americans with disabilities like Down syndrome.”); id. (“How is it 
that we are so willing to make such accommodation for and to celebrate with the disabled 
among us, yet we so easily accept the arguments to end their lives before they are born? It is 
the worst form of discrimination to violently rob them of their opportunity even to live.”); 
id. at 3 (“People with Down syndrome have the same fundamental rights as all other human 
beings. They are as valuable to our society as you or me. As you consider this legislation, 
consider our brothers and sisters with disabilities who live among us, and think of the 
message we send by standing by while others like them are devalued in our society through 
abortion.”); Hearing on H.R. 214 Before the H. Health Comm., 132d Gen. Assemb., Reg. 
Sess. (Ohio 2017–2018) (statement of Jessica Koehler, Director of Legislative Affairs, Right 
to Life Ohio at 2) [hereinafter Koehler Testimony] (“In many circumstances, the United 
States prohibits discrimination against persons with Down syndrome, and the Americans 
with Disabilities Act . . . creates certain protections for Americans with disabilities like 
Down syndrome. . . . People with Down syndrome have the same fundamental rights as all 
other human beings. They are as valuable to our society as you or me. As you consider this 
legislation, consider our brothers and sisters with disabilities who live among us, and think 
of the message we send by standing by while others like them are devalued in our society 
through abortion.”); supra note 157; cf. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Disability, Life, Death, and 
Choice, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 425, 437–41, 449–52 (2006) (discussing abortion and 
disability, including disability-selective abortion decisions). Thanks to Susan Appleton for 
reminding me about Bagenstos’s work.  
 160 Gonidakis Testimony, supra note 157, at 2 (noting that “[a]bortions resulting from 
tests like these, which identify Down syndrome among many other disabilities, are 
discriminatory toward those with disabilities,” and observing “[h]ow contradictory this 
seems to be, in a time where our culture so highly values diversity and works so hard to 
promote acceptance of the marginalized members of our communities”); see also, e.g., 
Merrin Testimony, supra note 1, at 2 (“Our laws cannot reflect a societal bias or lack of 
understanding that dehumanize those having a medical condition or that do not meet 
personal, subjective standards of quality. Unborn children with Down syndrome are no 
exception—they must be protected.”); Hearing on H.R. 214 Before the H. Health Comm., 
132d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2017–2018) (statement of Josh Brown, Legal Counsel 
and Director of Policy, Citizens for Community Values at 1) [hereinafter Brown Testimony] 
(“We write today to indicate our support for House Bill 214[,] [t]he Down Syndrome Non-
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question to be answered when analyzing the State’s interest in relation to 
persons with Down syndrome that H.B. 214 may be said to advance is, How, 
precisely, should this State interest be described? Is this an interest in 
vindicating the equal dignity and worth of persons with Down syndrome 
simply? An interest in vindicating the equal dignity and worth of persons with 
Down syndrome as a function of the equal dignity and worth of persons with 
disabilities? Or is it an interest in vindicating the equal dignity and worth of 
persons with Down syndrome as a function of the State’s broader interest in 
equality and first-rank citizenship status for persons who presently are and 
traditionally have been “marginalized members of our communities”? 
Because the assessment of the reasonableness of H.B. 214’s fit between its 
means and its ends depends on what the State’s interest is taken to be, the various 
expressions of the State’s interest in the equal dignity and worth of persons with 
Down syndrome will be taken up in turn. 
a. Expression One: H.B. 214 as a Means of Advancing the State’s 
Interest in Vindicating the Equal Dignity and Worth of Persons with 
Down Syndrome  
Begin by considering H.B. 214 as a means of advancing the State’s interest 
in vindicating the equal dignity and worth of persons with Down syndrome 
simpliciter. 
i. A Pro-Life Perspective  
From a pro-life perspective that understands life and personhood to begin at 
the moment of conception—a perspective that, of course, is reflected in H.B. 
214’s text, and was invoked by the bill’s sponsors and a number of its 
supporters161—H.B. 214 advances the State’s interest in vindicating the equal 
                                                                                                                     
discrimination Act, because this bill will help Ohio protect the most vulnerable among us.”); 
infra text accompanying notes 182–83. 
 161 For some evidence of this perspective in the text of the measure, consider H.B. 214, 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.10(A)(2), (B)(1)–(3) (West, Westlaw through File 51 of 132d 
Gen. Assemb. (2017–2018)), which uses the term “unborn child,” defined to have “the same 
meaning[] as in section 2919.16 of the Revised Code,” which itself defines “unborn child” 
as “an individual organism of the species homo sapiens from fertilization until live birth.” 
Id. § 2919.16(L). For evidence of this perspective in language from sponsors and supporters 
of H.B. 214, see, for example, LaTourette H.R. 214 Testimony: H. Health Comm., supra note 
23, at 1 (“The Down Syndrome Non-Discrimination Act[, H.B. 214,] is priority legislation 
for Ohio Right to Life . . . . [T]hese are not the stories of rape and unplanned pregnancies 
often used to explain away the practice of killing our unborn . . . .”); id. at 2–3 (“I believe 
that life begins at conception and that abortion should never be considered an option. 
However, regardless of if you agree with me or not, I hope that you can see that this is not 
an issue about abortion—it is an issue of discrimination. Discriminating against a person, 
not allowing them their God-given right to life, simply because they might have Down 
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dignity and worth of persons with Down syndrome, and it does so, consistent 
with this point of view, in a direct, immediate, and powerful way. 
Acknowledging that discrimination against persons with Down syndrome exists 
and operates on a social level, partly through the widespread circulation of 
outmoded stereotypes about the capacities and talents of persons with Down 
syndrome, a pro-life view of H.B. 214 readily sees the Down-syndrome-
selective abortions that the law outlaws as involving rank discrimination against 
persons—unborn persons—with or that may have Down syndrome that will end 
their lives and thwart their chances for any kind of life opportunities.162 In many 
cases, this discrimination may seem to result from the decisions, motivations, 
and ideas that pregnant women have in mind when deciding to end a pregnancy 
because of the actual or potential Down-syndrome status of the child she carries. 
                                                                                                                     
syndrome.”); Merrin Testimony, supra note 1, at 1 (“[O]ur legislation protects unborn 
children from discrimination . . . . I applaud Representative LaTourette’s steadfast work to 
defend unborn children with Down syndrome . . . , and . . . have welcomed the opportunity 
to partner with her moving forward. . . . I strongly believe life begins at conception and all 
unborn children deserve the right to life.”); Hearing on H.R. 214 Before the H. Health 
Comm., 132d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2017–2018) (statement of Barry Sheets, 
Legislative Consultant, Right to Life Action Coalition of Ohio at 1) [hereinafter Sheets 
Testimony] (describing the “Right to Life Action Coalition of Ohio” as “a network of 
organizations who stand together to uphold protections for defenseless unborn life,” and 
detailing the network’s engagement with one of the cosponsors of the bill on its language, 
and suggesting that the result of that process “is HB 214”); Hearing on H.R. 214 Before the 
H. Health Comm., 132d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2017–2018) (statement of Paula 
Westwood, Executive Director, Right to Life of Greater Cincinnati at 1) (“While every 
unborn child deserves protection from abortion death, House Bill 214 is helpful in protecting 
those targeted for destruction due to cultural bigotry against babies identified before birth as 
‘abnormal’ or ‘imperfect’ due to a Down Syndrome prediction.”). 
 162 Speaking about H.B. 214’s predecessor Down syndrome abortion ban, H.B. 135, 
H.R. 135, 131st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2015–2016), Representative LaTourette, 
apparently from a pro-life perspective, observed: “Choosing to end a person’s life simply 
because of this potential diagnosis [of Down syndrome] is discrimination. Period.” 
LaTourette H.R. 135 Testimony: H. Cmty. & Family Advancement Comm., supra note 144, 
at 1; accord Sullivan Testimony, supra note 146, at 4 (“George F. Will, himself a father of a 
child with Down Syndrome,” has “describe[d] the recent increase in prenatal testing as a 
‘Search and Destroy Mission’ against babies with this condition. . . . This is just eugenics, 
and it is blatant discrimination.” (footnote omitted)). Speaking somewhat more generally 
during the floor debate on H.B. 214 in the Ohio House of Representatives, Representative 
Derek Merrin outlined the “two general types of discrimination” that he understood to be at 
work in relation to Down syndrome selective abortions. Floor Debate on H.R. 214: 11-1-
2017, supra note 143, at 00:33:56 (statement of Rep. Derek Merrin). “The first is where you 
believe an individual has fewer or less rights than you do. Meaning: that other people are not 
equal to you. . . . The second type of discrimination is where people refuse to even 
acknowledge an individual exists or has any rights all.” Id. at 00:33:59. In the context of 
Representative Merrin’s remarks, both these types of discrimination are in play in cases in 
which the “right to life” of “unborn children” is not recognized, “and those with Down 
Syndrome are no exception.” Id. at 00:35:18.  
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These women, the pro-life thought goes, may be influenced in a distorting sort 
of way by discriminatory ideas, including stereotypes, about Down syndrome, 
which are readily capable of hindering a parent from having and acting on a 
clear-eyed vision of the full range of realities of what kind of life a child with 
Down syndrome might have after birth and also what parenting a child with 
Down syndrome might be like.163 The other possibility from this point of view 
is that an abortion because of the actual or potential Down-syndrome status of 
an unborn child might be discriminatory not because it is driven by 
discriminatory attitudes, but because of the decision’s effects, judged either in 
individual cases or in the aggregate. On this line, it matters that it is a life of an 
unborn person with or who may have Down syndrome that is distinctively being 
ended by a Down-syndrome-selective abortion. And it matters that the sum total 
of these decisions may have population-based effects. 
Taking up these two ways of understanding how anti-Down-syndrome 
discrimination may work in this setting consistent with a pro-life point of view, 
whether abortions of unborn persons with or who may have Down syndrome is 
discrimination against them because of a pregnant woman’s decisional 
processes or because of the impact that those processes have, there is, as a 
conceptual matter, a close and direct fit between the proffered State interest in 
vindicating the equal dignity and worth of persons with Down syndrome and 
the abortion ban that H.B. 214 contains. The reason for emphasizing the 
conceptual aspects of these arguments boils down to this: If one understands 
Down-syndrome-selective abortions as discrimination against persons with or 
who may have Down syndrome, it may not matter that, in the postviability 
setting, the State has discovered no established record of this type of 
discrimination happening in the present (or even in the past) tense. Seen in this 
light, there is no need to wait to see how often this discrimination has previously 
come up in light of existing postviability abortion bans or how often it might 
happen without H.B. 214’s Down-syndrome-selective abortion ban. The 
conceptually inflected understanding of the social meaning of the choice to abort 
an unborn child that has or may have Down syndrome and the meaning of this 
act for the unborn person whose life is thus being ended is, without more, a 
sufficient warrant to bar the eventuality from ever coming to pass. Indeed, one 
might well recognize the existence of the State’s current postviability abortion 
bans and still take the position that H.B. 214 is reasonably adapted to what 
should be regarded as a highly persuasive and even compelling State interest, if 
it saves the life of any unborn person who has or may have Down syndrome, 
                                                                                                                     
 163 Compare Mansfield et al., supra note 146, at 809–10 (“[H]igh [termination] rates 
might reflect thorough counselling and systematic decision-making before a diagnostic test 
is undergone, with all those not inclined to terminate a pregnancy affected by the condition 
being tested for, declining testing. Alternatively, they may reflect directive counselling from 
health professionals putting pressure on women to undergo a termination. Clearly the results 
of this review cannot address this.”), with id. at 810 (“The high rates for Down syndrome 
reflect the negative attitudes towards giving birth to a child with serious cognitive 
impairments.” (citation omitted)). 
64 OHIO’S “DOWN SYNDROME ABORTION BAN” [Vol. 79 
who would otherwise be discriminated against by being killed as a function of 
a pregnant woman’s abortion choice. An incrementally additional deterrent 
effect that could save the life of an unborn person with or who may have Down 
syndrome is clearly enough. Understanding this pro-life way of thinking may 
go some distance toward explaining why the State legislature considering H.B. 
214 and its Senate twin, S.B. 164, did not get hung up on the empirical need for 
a Down-syndrome-selective abortion ban in light of the State’s already-existing 
abortion bans. While this may account for, it does not constitutionally excuse, 
that fact. 
The pro-life position on the reasonableness of H.B. 214’s means of 
advancing the posited State interest in declaring and vindicating the equal 
dignity and worth of persons with Down syndrome covers, but does not hide, a 
related question of means–end reasonableness that is distinctively apparent from 
within a pro-life point of view. If H.B. 214 asserts the State’s interest in the 
project of declaring and vindicating the equal dignity and worth of persons with 
Down syndrome, the wonder is, Why does the law only protect some but not all 
persons with Down syndrome? The answer cannot be that already-born persons 
with Down syndrome cannot have their lives cut short by discrimination. No 
acrobatics are required to see in the medical setting the vulnerability of 
newborns with Down syndrome and of persons with Down syndrome later on 
in life, including close to life’s end, whose care, hence survival, might be made 
a function of quality of life judgments that are parasitic on or that otherwise 
reinforce discriminatory norms. And so, if H.B. 214 means to declare and 
vindicate the equal dignity and worth of persons with Down syndrome by saving 
lives that may be imperiled by decision-making in the medical setting, an 
obvious question to ask is why the law does not give all persons with Down 
syndrome and their lives equal protections against being discriminatorily 
ended?164 Why does H.B. 214 not safeguard all persons with Down syndrome 
from having their lives and life opportunities discriminatorily cut short?165 The 
same type of question arises outside of the context of medical caregiving, where 
H.B. 214’s protections might be useful, particularly as part of a larger 
antidiscrimination law that affords persons with Down syndrome a right to be 
free from the sorts of subtle and not-at-all subtle violence that anti-Down-
syndrome discrimination can take.166 From the range of needs of persons with 
                                                                                                                     
 164 See infra note 166. 
 165 There is also a noticeable degree of overinclusiveness at work here. To the extent 
that H.B. 214 is about vindicating the equal dignity and worth of persons with Down 
syndrome, even if that interest could properly have prenatal application, the measure would 
protect fetuses that do not actually have, but are only believed to possibly have, Down 
syndrome from a pregnant woman’s decision, when her reasons are known by the person to 
perform or attempt to perform an abortion. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.10(B)(3) (West, 
Westlaw through File 51 of 132d Gen. Assemb. (2017–2018)). 
 166 These forms of violence amounting to discrimination might include negative as well 
as positive stereotyping about the talents and capacities of persons with Down syndrome that 
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Down syndrome to first-class citizenship status—needs that might also include 
forms of publicly funded care that, not incidentally, an amendment to H.B. 214 
would have provided, but which were rejected by the Ohio House167—the 
limitation of H.B. 214 to the abortion setting looks to be highly underinclusive 
in view of the State’s ends. Seen in light of the full range of needs that persons 
with Down syndrome have and what it would take for the State to declare and 
vindicate the equal dignity and worth of persons with Down syndrome, it might 
reasonably appear, to some observers at least, that H.B. 214 is not actually about 
declaring and vindicating the equal dignity and worth of persons with Down 
syndrome so much as it is about using that idea, and hence persons with Down 
syndrome, as instruments, as pawns, as objects, in a larger pro-life campaign.168 
                                                                                                                     
leaves them with a constricted range of opportunities for public and private life. See David 
M. Perry, Don’t Label People with Down Syndrome, CNN (Nov. 17, 2012), 
https://www.cnn.com/2012/11/16/opinion/perry-down-syndrome/ [https://perma.cc/R6LF-
XYMP] (“[W]hile good intentions count for a lot, ‘angel’ [as a description of children with 
Down syndrome] makes me no happier than ‘retard.’ . . . The words ‘retard’ and ‘angel’ 
represent images that dehumanize and disempower. Both words connote two-dimensional, 
simple or limited people. Neither angels nor retards can live in the world with the rest of us, 
except as pets, charity cases or abstract sources of inspiration.”). The forms of violence 
amounting to discrimination might also take the form of interpersonal violence against the 
bodies of persons with Down syndrome, some of it overt, see, e.g., People v. Davis, 585 
N.E.2d 214, 216 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (involving sexual assault and abuse against victim with 
Down syndrome), and some of it not, though no less consequential for that, see Ziegler, 
supra note 58, at 603–08, 605 n.119 (discussing “the so-called Baby Doe controversy,” 
described as involving a Down syndrome child who died after the child’s parents declined 
surgery for a condition “that physicians could often correct,” and then going on to elaborate 
some of the law reforms, including “the final version of the Baby Doe rules,” 45 C.F.R. 
§ 84.55 (2017), that the case helped to spawn). 
 167 The Ohio House of Representatives rejected several floor amendments to H.B. 214 
during debate on the measure, including one offered by Representative Nickie Antonio, 
Floor Debate on H.R. 214: 11-1-2017, supra note 143, at 1:02:45 (statement of Rep. Nickie 
Antonio), ultimately tabled, see id. at 1:14:45, that would have redistributed economic 
resources to pregnant women carrying fetuses with Down syndrome and to children and later 
adults born with Down syndrome. Id. at 1:04:33 (discussing details of proposed amendment). 
For some, the tabling of this amendment frames a question about how seriously and deeply 
H.B. 214 reflects the State’s commitment to promote the equal dignity and worth of persons 
with Down syndrome tout court. See Miracle H.R. 135 Testimony: H. Cmty. & Family 
Advancement Comm., supra note 74, at 2 (“[A]s we debate this bill [H.B. 135], the budget 
passed by this Ohio House slashes funding for programs that serve people with 
developmental disabilities, the House passed budget even significantly cuts Medicaid 
funding for this population. . . . Funding for special education programs also falls short of 
what is needed in this state. . . . Will this woman have access to maternity leave and/or paid 
sick leave to help her bond with her child and help her continue to earn a wage if she has to 
take time off to help take care of her child? Looking at the statistics, the answer is probably 
not.”). 
 168 Writing about the issue, David Perry, who regularly writes about disability rights and 
who testified on H.B. 214, Hearing on H.R. 214 Before the H. Health Comm., 132d Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2017–2018) (statement of David Perry at 1) (“I am the father of 
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If this is right, the State’s interest in declaring and vindicating the equal dignity 
and worth of persons with Down syndrome is not so much advanced by H.B. 
214 as it is defeated by it. Whatever the intention, to reduce persons with Down 
syndrome to political things violates the very principle of treating persons with 
Down syndrome as being entitled to equal dignity and worth—and respect. 
ii. A Non-Pro-Life Perspective 
Departing from a pro-life perspective, the reasonableness of the measure as 
a way of declaring and vindicating the equal dignity and worth of persons with 
Down syndrome takes on an even harder and more negative cast. From the 
vantage point of the Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence, the neat, tight fit 
between the ostensibly egalitarian ends of the legislation and its means of 
achieving them must be reconfigured in a different and more complex light.  
Since Roe, the right to abortion has been built in part upon the notion that 
the concept of “personhood” as used in the U.S. Constitution has only postnatal 
application.169 This means that the State’s interest in the equal dignity and worth 
of persons with Down syndrome cannot be credited, constitutionally, as being 
directly implicated by H.B. 214. There might well be thought to be a connection 
                                                                                                                     
a boy with Down syndrome and am opposed to [H.B. 214]. This bill will not lower rates of 
abortion following a prenatal diagnosis nor will it help people with Down syndrome.”), and 
S.B. 164, Hearing on S. 164 Before the S. Health, Human Servs. & Medicaid Comm., 132d 
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2017–2018) (statement of David Perry at 1), has made this 
point in different contexts. See David M. Perry, How Ohio Is Using Down Syndrome To 
Criminalize Abortion, PAC. STANDARD (Oct. 3, 2017), https://psmag.com/social-justice/gop- 
using-down-syndrome-as-cynical-wedge [https://perma.cc/XE8N-6S2N] (“Still, Down 
syndrome has emerged as a major front in the cultural divide around reproductive access, 
with similar attempts [in addition to Ohio] underway in North Dakota, Missouri, and 
Louisiana. The cynical use of my son’s disability as a wedge issue hasn’t made the world 
any better for him.”); David M. Perry, Ohio Abortion Ban, HOW DID WE GET INTO THIS MESS? 
(Nov. 16, 2017), http://www.thismess.net/2017/11/ohio-abortion-ban.html [https://perma.cc/ 
4KHH-C5HM] (“It’s happening. Ohio is going to pass an anti-choice bill that criminalizes 
speech between a woman and her doctor. . . . This won’t help people with Down syndrome. 
It’s not intended to. It just keeps spreading stigma on the one hand, while serving as a vehicle 
to restrict reproductive rights on the other.”); David M. Perry, Resources: Down Syndrome 
and the Abortion Wars, HOW DID WE GET INTO THIS MESS? (Aug. 24, 2015), 
http://www.thismess.net/2015/08/resources-down-syndrome-and-abortion.html [https://perma.cc/ 
9YRM-BWZQ] (“As a parent of a child with Down syndrome and a pro-choice man, I have 
this to say. 1) The Forced Birth movement does not actually care about disability rights. 2) 
The right-wing is very good at playing divide and conquer with disability rights. 3) We have 
a lot of actual work to do. This isn’t helping.”). Thanks to my colleague Ruth Colker for 
introducing me to Perry’s writing and work on this issue. 
 169 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157–59 (1973) (discussing and concluding that “the 
word ‘person,’ as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn”); see 
also id. at 162 (“In short, the unborn have never been recognized in the law as persons in the 
whole sense.”). 
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between H.B. 214’s ban on Down-syndrome-selective abortions and the State’s 
interest in declaring and vindicating the equal dignity and worth of people with 
Down syndrome, but that connection, if it is to be credited as a matter of 
constitutional law, can only be seen as operating indirectly, at some stage of 
causal remove.  
Even so, the causal argument, or story, is familiar in its structure from any 
number of pro-equality discourses.170 In one version, Down-syndrome-selective 
abortions, either in their motivations or in their effects, reflect and reinforce 
historical and contemporary sentiments about lives lived with Down 
syndrome—sentiments that hold these lives are not as valuable or as worth 
living as other lives are.171 The normalization of Down-syndrome-selective 
abortions, to borrow a term found in the Supreme Court’s opinion in Gonzales 
v. Carhardt, may thus “coarsen” the longstanding and still-existing 
discriminatory attitudes about people, meaning born persons, with Down 
syndrome, hindering the recognition and the lived experiences of their equal 
dignity and worth.172 Seen in this light, although the lives of constitutional 
“persons” with Down syndrome are not directly and immediately implicated by 
H.B. 214, the law still advances the State’s interest in the equal dignity and 
                                                                                                                     
 170 In the abortion setting alone, cognate arguments may be run in relation to sex-
selective abortions. For one analysis that articulates and engages these arguments, while 
tracking feminist views that both see the sex equality tradeoffs that sex-selective abortions 
involve and hold that it would be “politically imprudent, given the precarious nature of 
women’s reproductive rights” to endorse a “legal prohibition of sex-selective abortion,” see 
April L. Cherry, A Feminist Understanding of Sex-Selective Abortion: Solely a Matter of 
Choice?, 10 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 161, 181–87, 219–22 (1995). 
 171 The form of the point, put more generally, is on display in Ziegler, supra note 58. 
Reporting on a 1998 “strategy session” hosted by the National Abortion Rights Action 
League (NARAL), Ziegler writes that one “attendee [there] noted [that]: ‘Disability-rights 
people raised the question about whether aborting [a pregnancy] . . . demeans what it 
[means] to be a human being with a disability.’” Id. at 610–11 (third and fourth alterations 
in original). Continuing with this idea, it has elsewhere been observed that:  
Selective abortion prevents disability not in an existing human being or in a fetus likely 
to come to term; instead, it prevents disability by preventing the fetus from becoming a 
person with a disability. It implies that it may be better for the child not to be born at all 
rather than to be born with a disability. Advocacy for this form of primary prevention, 
then, appears to disvalue and disrespect persons living with similar disabling conditions, 
sending them the message that they are mistakes that society would eliminate if it had 
the technological capacity. It connotes that if people do not meet a certain health 
standard, they should not be welcomed into the family or the world. 
Adrienne Asch et al., Respecting Persons with Disabilities and Preventing Disability: Is 
There a Conflict?, in THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES 
319, 326 (Stanley S. Herr et al. eds., 2003). Further elaboration is in id. at 327. 
 172 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157 (2007) (“Congress stated as follows: 
‘Implicitly approving such a brutal and inhumane procedure by choosing not to prohibit it 
will further coarsen society to the humanity of not only newborns, but all vulnerable and 
innocent human life, making it increasingly difficult to protect such life.’”). 
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worth of born persons with Down syndrome by preventing the further 
ossification of social and cultural attitudes already in circulation in ways that 
keeps persons with Down syndrome from achieving their rank as first-class 
persons. Connecting the dots, this is the conclusion: Banning abortions because 
of the actual or possible Down-syndrome status of a fetus furthers the State’s 
interest in vindicating the equality and dignity of born persons with Down 
syndrome.173 
The challenge of this line of reasoning for those who consider themselves 
as equality-minded liberals or progressives is that its form is such an elemental 
part of antidiscrimination discourses that, to reject it in this setting, may seem 
to risk having, in principle, to reconsider, if not reject it, elsewhere as a bid on 
how social and cultural life under law ought to be reformed. Recognizing the 
salutary effects of calls to reconsider well-worn lines of thought, in this case, it 
does seem as though part of H.B. 214’s design is to generate just this sort of 
dilemma for liberals and progressives committed broadly to principles of social 
equality. 
Whatever the politics or the pleasures of producing this dilemma, the 
challenge that the causal argument for H.B. 214 presents is not so ineluctable as 
at first glance appears.  
To see why, notice where, in constitutional terms, the argument about H.B. 
214 stands at this point. On the ordinary postviability terrain, Ohio law already 
multiply outlaws all abortions no matter why a pregnant woman might choose 
to have one if she could. This is why, as an additional layer of anti-abortion 
protection on top of the others already in force, where the initial layers of 
protection have not been shown inadequate to the task of protecting and 
preserving the lives of fetuses that have or may have Down syndrome, H.B. 214 
is not a measure that reasonably advances the State’s interest in protecting and 
preserving fetal life. For much the same reason, H.B. 214 does not reasonably 
further the State’s interest in declaring and vindicating the equal dignity and 
worth of born persons with Down syndrome. If the State laws that already 
multiply bar all postviability abortions are working as intended, and if they are 
keeping all postviability abortions—including Down-syndrome-selective 
abortions—from taking place, then there is no practice of Down-syndrome-
selective abortions that exists to reflect or reinforce discrimination against born 
                                                                                                                     
 173 Speaking of H.B. 135, H.R. 135, 131st Gen. Assemb., Reg Sess. (Ohio 2015–2016) 
(as reported by the H. Cmty. & Family Advancement Comm., June 17, 2015), an earlier 
measure that would have banned Down-syndrome-selective abortions in a more limited 
range of circumstances than H.B. 214 does, Dr. Ashley Fernandes observed: “HB 135 will 
send a message to the citizens of Ohio that Down Syndrome children, whether born or 
unborn, are equal in dignity and value to the rest of us. Such a law will have a protective 
effect on already-born children and adults with Down Syndrome that transcends 
‘symbolism.’” Hearing on H.R. 135 Before the H. Cmty. & Family Advancement Comm., 
131st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2015–2016) (statement of Ashley K. Fernandes, 
Associate Director, Center for Bioethics and Medical Humanities, The Ohio State University 
College of Medicine; Board Member, Ohio Right to Life; Associate Professor of Pediatrics, 
Nationwide Children’s Hospital at 10). 
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persons with Down syndrome. From aught that appears, H.B. 214 is not needed 
as a means of blocking the abortion practice that would perpetuate anti-Down-
syndrome discrimination, which in turn means that H.B. 214 does not materially 
advance the State’s interest in declaring and vindicating the equal worth of born 
persons with Down syndrome.  
This leaves H.B. 214 to be justified, if at all, as a symbolic measure. While 
the law cannot at present be taken to make any material difference to 
postviability abortion practice, hence by extension, concretely to advance the 
equal dignity and worth of born persons with Down syndrome, the measure 
might still be thought to function as a way for the State to send out the message 
that it values and is committed to declaring and vindicating the equal dignity 
and worth of born persons with Down syndrome. This may in different ways be 
thought to be of real practical benefit to them. Appreciating that this line of 
thought hangs together well enough to be not just sensible, but reasonable, the 
judgment it reflects all too easily misses the way in which fetuses with or that 
may have Down syndrome are, in this symbolic accounting of H.B. 214, being 
themselves reduced to symbols, mere political objects, reflecting maneuvering 
inconsonant with dedication to the equal dignity and worth, including the full 
human value, of born persons with Down syndrome. There is something 
problematic to the point of being unreasonable about the paradox of reducing 
fetuses with or that may have Down syndrome to object-symbols in order to 
vindicate the lived equal dignity and worth of born persons with Down 
syndrome. This is particularly so when the multiple prohibitions against all 
postviability abortions formally treat all postviability fetuses equally, and hence 
advance the equality status of fetuses that have or may have Down syndrome—
a state of affairs that itself may be taken as sending out a clear message that 
prenatal and postnatal life that is or may be lived with Down syndrome is as 
dignified and valuable and meaningful as any other kind of human life there is. 
Where H.B. 214 might actually be able to materially advance the State’s 
interest in vindicating the equal dignity and worth of born persons with Down 
syndrome is on the postviability terrain encompassed by the constitutional safe 
harbor for postviability choice, where an abortion may still be secured when 
needed to protect or preserve a pregnant woman’s life or health. Within the 
boundaries of that safe harbor, however, the reasonableness of the State’s means 
of achieving its end—its ban on any Down-syndrome-related abortion—comes 
at the direct expense of the choice that a pregnant woman would ordinarily make 
in consultation with her attending physician to end a pregnancy in order to 
protect her life or her health. Stated differently, within the constitutional safe 
harbor for postviability choice, the State’s interest in the equal dignity and worth 
of persons with Down syndrome, as advanced by H.B. 214, concretely 
implicates the other State interest in play in that setting, long held to be 
constitutionally safeguarded: the State’s interest in protecting and preserving the 
pregnant woman’s life and health. This State interest and the important 
constitutional values of women’s autonomy and equality that it reflects must be 
accounted for in any evaluation of the reasonableness of the State’s effort 
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through H.B. 214 to vindicate the equal dignity and worth of persons with Down 
syndrome. When they are added to the mix, the reasons for regarding H.B. 214 
as unreasonably adapted to the end of vindicating the equal dignity and worth 
of born persons with Down syndrome appear. Much like it is unreasonable for 
the State to deny the autonomy of pregnant women to make important life and 
health decisions for themselves in the interests of protecting and preserving the 
State’s interest in protecting and preserving fetal life, the State does not act 
reasonably when it treats women’s bodies as vessels for the understandable, 
important, and even generally compelling independent project of declaring and 
vindicating the equal dignity and worth of persons with Down syndrome. The 
State cannot strip individual pregnant women of their autonomy, cannot deny 
the autonomy of pregnant women as a class, by forcing them to run immediate 
risks to life and health in order to satisfy the State’s concern, however otherwise 
vital, to vindicate the equal dignity and worth of persons with Down syndrome. 
The unreasonableness of this position may be most obvious in cases in which 
H.B. 214 would cost a woman her life in service of the State’s project of 
vindicating the equal dignity and worth not of her fetus exactly but of born 
persons with Down syndrome. But it is still unreasonable in cases in which H.B. 
214 would cost a pregnant woman her health, whether physical or 
psychological. As the Supreme Court’s abortion case law has developed, 
women’s psychological well-being has been of a piece with the other concerns 
for women’s health postviability.174 Consistent with the thrust of those decisions 
and their implicit configurations of reasonableness, it would be unreasonable for 
the State not to recognize that the immediate risks to health that H.B. 214 would 
force a pregnant woman to run outweighs the State’s causal case for maintaining 
that all postviability Down-syndrome-selective abortions must be stopped in the 
interest of vindicating the equality dignity and worth status of born persons with 
Down syndrome. 
To be clear, this is not to say that the State is powerless to advance the view 
that Down-syndrome-selective abortions postviability, as much as and perhaps, 
given their nearness to birth, more so than previability Down-syndrome-related 
abortions, should be understood as reflecting and reinforcing the inequality of 
born persons with Down syndrome. Consistent with the previability allowances 
made for informed consent measures that restrict but do not unduly burden the 
right to a previability abortion, the State presumably could publicize its 
opposition to discrimination against persons with Down syndrome in the 
postviability abortion setting by, say, seeking to ensure that pregnant women 
contemplating Down-syndrome-selective abortions receive truthful, 
nonmisleading, and up-to-date information about what life with Down 
syndrome is like and what it is like to parent a child with the condition.175 Along 
                                                                                                                     
 174 See supra note 50 (collecting a number of relevant sources). 
 175 Along these lines, consider Substitute House Bill 552, the Down Syndrome 
Information Act, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.69 (West, Westlaw through File 51 of 132d 
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similar lines, the State might likewise seek to ensure that pregnant women 
contemplating Down-syndrome-selective abortions hear and understand the 
State’s view of how their abortion decisions may contribute to the social 
inequality of this traditionally subordinated group. Importantly, information-
based mechanisms like these for advancing the State’s interest in declaring and 
vindicating the equal dignity and worth of persons with Down syndrome do not 
take the additional step H.B. 214 does: denying women’s autonomy in a way 
that also strikes at women’s equality, by perpetuating old and discredited 
stereotypes about women that hold they are objects of their biological—read: 
reproductive—destinies.176 There is something palpably unreasonable about the 
State furthering indirectly its interest in the equal dignity and worth of persons 
with Down syndrome by making pregnant woman pay for that achievement 
immediately or over the longer term with the coin of their own autonomy or 
equality, including their lives and health. 
b. Expression Two: H.B. 214 as a Means of Declaring and Vindicating 
the State’s Interest in the Equal Dignity and Worth of Persons with 
Down Syndrome as an Expression of the State’s Interest in the Equal 
Dignity and Worth of All Persons with Disabilities 
Next, consider H.B. 214 as a means of declaring and vindicating the State’s 
interest in the equal dignity and worth of persons with Down syndrome as an 
expression of the State’s broader interest in the equal dignity and worth of all 
persons with disabilities. Analysis of this way of expressing the State’s interest 
in enacting H.B. 214, as with the last, implicates complex issues of causation, 
which vary depending on whether the measure is seen from a pro-life or a non-
pro-life point of view. For the time being, analysis of those questions can 
productively be bracketed to highlight a relatively simpler concern.177 
Recognizing that Down syndrome is a somatic condition with its own 
distinctive features, it is common enough, as during legislative deliberations on 
H.B. 214 and its Senate twin, S.B. 164, to think of anti-Down-syndrome 
                                                                                                                     
Gen. Assemb. (2017–2018)) (codifying H.R. 552, 130th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 
2014)), which involves the collection, publication, and sharing of information about Down 
syndrome under a limited range of circumstances. 
 176 See, e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141–42 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring) 
(“The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil[l] the noble and benign offices 
of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator. And the rules of civil society must be 
adapted to the general constitution of things, and cannot be based upon exceptional cases.”). 
 177 This approach will also be taken in relation to the third way of expressing the State’s 
interest in the equal dignity and worth of persons with Down syndrome—as a function of the 
State’s interest in declaring and vindicating the equal dignity and worth of all the 
“marginalized members of our communities,” discussed infra Part IV.B.2.c. 
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discrimination as a type of disability discrimination,178 and so to see H.B. 214’s 
protections of the equal dignity and worth of persons with Down syndrome as 
an expression of the State’s broader interest in declaring and vindicating the 
equal dignity and worth of all persons with disabilities.179 Viewed this way, one 
understanding of the issue of the reasonableness of H.B. 214’s means of 
achieving its end circles around whether Down syndrome is sufficiently distinct 
among the full range of disabilities so as to warrant in the abortion setting the 
distinctive status and protections offered by H.B. 214. 
Whatever the case for believing that it is, no defense of H.B. 214 along these 
lines was mounted in any clear, prominent, and dedicated way during the course 
of public legislative proceedings on the bill or its Senate twin, S.B. 164.180 This, 
                                                                                                                     
 178 This class might be defined by genetic inheritance, see, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE 
§ 14-02.1-02(7) (2017) (banning abortions on the basis of “any defect, disease, or disorder 
that is inherited genetically,” and defining these conditions to include “any physical 
disfigurement, scoliosis, dwarfism, Down syndrome, albinism, amelia, or any other type of 
physical or mental disability, abnormality or disease”), or more broadly, as under the terms 
of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2012). Dov Fox & Christopher 
L. Griffin, Jr., Disability-Selective Abortion and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 2009 
UTAH L. REV. 845, 852 (2009) (“Down syndrome typically counts as a disability under the 
ADA.” (citing 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B (2007))). But see id. at n.40 (citing contrary authority). 
Indeed, testimony was offered on H.B. 214 urging that the legislation be “expand[ed]” to 
include “unborn children diagnosed with Trisomy-18 (Edward’s Syndrome), another 
chromosomal anomaly, second most common to Downs’.” Sheets Testimony, supra note 
161, at 2; see also Merrin Testimony, supra note 1, at 1 (“Whether a child should live or die, 
should not be determined by their natural-born appearance, physical characteristics, or 
disability.”); Koehler Testimony, supra note 159, at 2 (“Abortions resulting from tests like 
these, which identify Down syndrome among many other disabilities, are discriminatory 
toward those with disabilities. It is that simple.”). 
 179 This approach is not unique to H.B. 214. Ginny Engholm, Prenatal Testing and 
Counseling: The New Front of the Abortion Wars?, NURSING CLIO (July 29, 2014), 
http://nursingclio.org/2014/07/29/prenatal-testing-and-counseling-the-new-front-of-the-
abortion-wars/ [https://perma.cc/T6S7-2L2Q] (noting, while discussing Louisiana’s passage 
of “a version of the Down Syndrome Information Act,” that the measure “was not 
spearheaded by the Down syndrome community,” but instead was “driven largely by the 
Bioethics Defense Fund,” which “frames the change to the law as an issue of discrimination 
and argues that presenting termination as an acceptable option for women in the event of a 
prenatal diagnosis of Down syndrome constitutes state-sponsored discrimination that 
violates the Americans with Disabilities Act”). 
 180 But see Hearing on H.R. 135 Before the H. Cmty. & Family Advancement Comm., 
131st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2015–2016) (statement of Heather Bellagia-Ernest at 
1) (“My initial thought was why should babies with Down syndrome have such a protection, 
but not others? All babies deserve to live. But then the word ‘Extinction’ hit me. With 9 out 
of 10 babies with Down syndrome being aborted, extinction is what we are really talking 
about.”). Arguments in relation to the distinctiveness of Down syndrome might focus on its 
biological distinctiveness, including how common it is compared to other “chromosomal 
abnormalit[ies].” Sullivan Testimony, supra note 146, at 3 (“Down Syndrome is the most 
common chromosomal abnormality today . . . .”). While these reasons might justify singling 
out Down syndrome among other disabilities in some settings, they were not pressed with 
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even though the argument was leveled against the measures that, in singling out 
Down syndrome from among other forms of disability, H.B. 214 created an 
unjustified “hierarchy of disabilities.”181  
Against this complaint, the candid defense of H.B. 214 that at times surfaced 
was not that it was justified in taking only the single step that it does or that 
fetuses with Down syndrome were truly distinctive in a comparative disability 
sense. To the contrary, the idea was that H.B. 214 was a provisional measure, a 
step foreshadowing other similar decisional abortion bans yet to come.  
One of the most notable articulations of this response—indeed, perhaps the 
most notable one—arrived during the floor debate on H.B. 214 in the Ohio 
House of Representatives. Representative Christina Hagan, a strong supporter 
of H.B. 214, took the floor in order to “applaud both of the sponsors for their 
courage, their conviction, and their drive to protect the most vulnerable 
populations in our communities.”182 After speaking about the Icelandic 
experience with Down-syndrome-selective abortions, Representative Hagan, 
apparently turning to the domestic U.S. scene, observed that:  
There is mass genocide that is occurring in this Nation. When we talk about 
eradicating entire walks of life, we should be embarrassed, we should be 
ashamed, and we should be shaken to the core to stand for these vulnerable 
populations. That’s exactly what these men and women are doing here today. 
And so if there is a motion to extend protection to other types of chromosomal 
deficiencies or abnormalities or anomalies, you better bet we’re going for them 
all. We’re going to protect every unborn baby. And it will take many different 
layers of legislation extending protection [to] unborn children, but we’re not 
                                                                                                                     
any dedication in a comparative sense during public deliberations on H.B. 214 or its Senate 
twin, S.B. 164. One possible reason why is that supporters of the measures, or some of them 
anyway, wished to leverage legislative success on one or the other of them in the direction 
of barring other types of disability-selective abortions. See infra notes 182–85 and 
accompanying text. 
 181 Hearing on H.R. 214 Before the H. Health Comm., 132d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 
(Ohio 2017–2018) (statement of Jane Gerhardt, Policy Specialist, Leadership Education in 
Neurodevelopmental and Related Disabilities at 1) (“With this bill, the Ohio House tells us 
that individuals with Spina Bifida, Fragile X, achondroplasia, CF, OI, and every other 
genetically based disability, aren’t worthy of protection. This bill creates a hierarchy of 
disabilities, with Down syndrome at the top, receiving state sanctioned protection and 
stigmatizes every other disability, not deserving of that same protection.”). For a similar view 
from a different direction, see infra note 184 (quoting Senator Matt Dolan’s views). 
 182 Floor Debate on H.R. 214: 11-1-2017, supra note 143, at 1:01:36 (statement of Rep. 
Christina Hagan). No less significant was sponsor testimony by Senator Frank LaRose on 
S.B. 164, which focused on how fetuses with Down syndrome are “unborn children with 
disabilities.” LaRose Testimony, supra note 143, at 1 (“The life of a child with Down 
syndrome is not worth any less than the life [of] another child. This legislation will protect 
the lives of unborn children with disabilities and value them as equal members of society.”). 
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forgetting these children today who are absolutely a target of an industry that 
wishes to eradicate them and erase them from the face of the earth.183 
Representative Hagan’s remarks affirm what might otherwise in part be read 
off the face of H.B. 214: If the measure is animated by a concern for the equal 
dignity and worth of people with Down syndrome and that concern is itself 
grounded in a concern for people with disabilities, more generally, a group 
defined in part by what Representative Hagan called “other types of 
chromosomal deficiencies or abnormalities or anomalies,” then there is no good 
reason for H.B. 214 to single out fetuses with Down syndrome for distinctive 
protections.184 To say that H.B. 214 is but a first step in the direction of 
“protect[ing] every unborn baby” or even all postviability fetuses might be 
constitutionally reasonable were that first step being taken on the terrain of 
ordinary social or economic legislation.185 But where—as with H.B. 214—the 
question arises on the terrain of the constitutional abortion right and involves an 
inquiry into constitutional reasonableness, the measure looks seriously 
underinclusive in that it does not protect all fetuses with disabilities. H.B. 214’s 
ban on only Down-syndrome-selective abortions does not go nearly far enough 
for the measure to be deemed to have a reasonable fit with a general pro-
disability-equality end. 
c. Expression Three: H.B. 214 as a Means of Declaring and Vindicating 
the State’s Interest in the Equal Dignity and Worth of All the 
“Marginalized Members of Our Communities”  
Finally, consider H.B. 214 as a means of declaring and vindicating the 
State’s interest in the equal dignity and worth of all the “marginalized members 
                                                                                                                     
 183 Floor Debate on H.R. 214: 11-1-2017, supra note 143, at 1:01:50 (statement of Rep. 
Christina Hagan); see also Harmon, supra note 143 (“A dwindling Down syndrome 
population, which now stands at about 350,000, could mean less institutional support and 
reduced funds for medical research. It could also mean a lonelier world for those who 
remain. . . . Many participants in the ad-hoc movement describe themselves as pro-choice. 
Yet some see themselves as society’s first line of defense against a use of genetic technology 
that can border on eugenics.”). 
 184 As Senator Matt Dolan observed during the Ohio Senate floor debate on S.B. 164, 
“[w]hat concerns me about this bill is that it does not provide equal protection under the 
law. . . . [F]or very noble and heartwarming reasons, we are choosing one segment, one 
disease, to have rights greater than another, and I think courts will have trouble with that.” 
Ohio Senate, 132d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., Floor Debate on S. 164: 11-15-2017, OHIO 
CHANNEL, at 0:35:55 (Ohio 2017–2018), http://www.ohiosenate.gov/session/session-video-
library (click on “11-15-2017”) (statement of Sen. Matt Dolan). 
 185 A classic statement of the “one step at a time” idea involving ordinary social or 
economic legislation is in Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955). 
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of our communities,”186 a broad equality aim.187 If the fit between H.B. 214’s 
end and its means of achieving it is attenuated, and hence unreasonable, when 
the measure is understood as being about the equal dignity and worth of persons 
with disabilities, the fit is even looser, and the attenuation is only more severe, 
when H.B. 214 is seen and defended as a measure that protects fetuses with or 
that may have Down syndrome as an expression of the State’s basic interest in 
safeguarding and promoting the equal dignity and worth of “marginalized 
members of our communities,”188 or as Representative Hagan put it, “the most 
vulnerable populations in our communities.”189 
Understood as being about the welfare of the socially marginalized, H.B. 
214 is radically underinclusive in view of its failure to provide protections for 
fetuses that are or may be marked by other disabilities and, for that matter, for 
fetuses that are marked by other signs of social vulnerability, sometimes more 
than one vulnerability at once. H.B. 214 is also overinclusive in the nontechnical 
sense that it singles out fetuses that have or may have Down syndrome among 
all the indicators of vulnerability. The near-arbitrariness of this selection shifts 
attention away from fetuses and onto pregnant women themselves. They are 
treated by H.B. 214 in a way that practically overlooks their own status as 
belonging to a vulnerable population, indeed, a constitutionally recognized 
vulnerable population,190 while reflecting and reinforcing discredited 
stereotypes about women not only as vessels for reproduction in society’s 
interests, but also stereotypes about women, and pregnant women, in particular, 
as “irresponsible decisionmakers”191 who cannot be trusted and so are not 
                                                                                                                     
 186 See, e.g., Gonidakis Testimony, supra note 157, at 2 (“How contradictory this seems 
to be, in a time where our culture so highly values diversity and works so hard to promote 
acceptance of the marginalized members of our communities.”).  
 187 Analysis of this expression of the State’s interest involves complex questions of 
causation that are bracketed here, as in the last part, in order to focus on the concerns 
addressed in the text. See supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
 188 See, e.g., Gonidakis Testimony, supra note 157, at 2 (“How contradictory this seems 
to be, in a time where our culture so highly values diversity and works so hard to promote 
acceptance of the marginalized members of our communities.”). 
 189 Floor Debate on H.R. 214: 11-1-2017, supra note 143, at 1:01:40 (statement of Rep. 
Christina Hagan). For the larger quote from which this language is drawn, see supra text 
accompanying note 182. Along similar lines, see also, for example, Brown Testimony, supra 
note 160, at 1 (“House Bill 214 . . . will help Ohio protect the most vulnerable among us.”); 
supra text accompanying note 183. 
 190 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 519 (1996). 
 191 Useful thinking in this direction is in Cherry, supra note 170, at 207 (noting how a 
certain type of feminist analysis might see “the social consequences of a legal prohibition of 
sex-selective abortion” as “the reinforcement of women’s subordinate status and the 
denigration of women as irresponsible decisionmakers, which would ‘nibble away at our 
hard won reproductive control’”); id. at 209 (“Prohibiting abortion denigrates women as 
decisionmakers, and it reinforces their role as sexual objects by undermining their ability to 
act as sexual agents. It further reduces the limited power that women are allowed to exercise 
over their bodies and their sexuality in our society.” (quoting Frances Olsen, Comment, 
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entitled to first-class rights as autonomous agents capable of shaping their own 
lives and destinies.  
In point of fact, given the wildly differential fit between what H.B. 214 
narrowly does and the deeper equality grounds that, on this line, the measure is 
said to advance, its fit problems extend past those of reasonableness and fully 
expose a perspective on the measure that has previously been glimpsed.192 On 
close inspection, H.B. 214 appears not to be a law that is designed to further a 
basically egalitarian end, at least not as a constitutionally creditable aim. Rather, 
noting the poor job it does of advancing a general equality goal, H.B. 214 
appears to be a measure that is singularly about the State’s interest in protecting 
and preserving fetal life, animated certainly in some instances by the goal, as 
Representative Hagan stated it, of “protect[ing] every unborn baby,” and, as part 
of that effort, of creating another “layer[] of legislation extending protection to 
unborn children” in order to stop the “mass genocide that is occurring in this 
Nation.”193 
If this is right, the State’s interest in protecting and preserving fetal life is 
the only real constitutional basis that could justify H.B. 214, including as a 
postviability measure. And for the reasons previously discussed, it is not a 
reasonable means of achieving that end. To say this is not to take the position 
that abortions involving fetuses with or that may have Down syndrome cannot 
ever in any way be prohibited. Indeed, they can be, and in the way that they 
more or less already are under State law: under a postviability abortion rule of 
general applicability, subject to the constraint of allowing for abortions needed 
to protect or preserve maternal life and health. A general rule banning all 
abortions after fetal viability on equal terms, which, not incidentally, is the sort 
of measure that seems to have originally been contemplated by Roe and other 
cases within the Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence, would be, and is, a 
constitutionally reasonable way for the State to advance its interest in protecting 
and preserving fetal life. H.B. 214—not that—is not. 
C. A “Reasonable Fit” Analysis in the Present Tense 
These are the sorts of granular, context specific judgments about H.B. 214’s 
constitutionality that can be worked up from the values discoverable in the 
Supreme Court’s Roe and Roe-era jurisprudence. To take the position that H.B. 
214 fails the test of the reasonableness of its fit between its underlying purposes 
                                                                                                                     
Unraveling Compromise, 103 HARV. L. REV. 105, 121 (1989))). It is also found in April 
Shaw, How Race-Selective and Sex-Selective Bans on Abortion Expose the Color-Coded 
Dimensions of the Right to Abortion and Deficiencies in Constitutional Protections for 
Women of Color, 40 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 545, 576–77 (2016) (noting problems 
of stereotyping that have tracked some critiques of decisional abortion bans).  
 192 See supra note 168 and accompanying text. 
 193 Floor Debate on H.R. 214: 11-1-2017, supra note 143, at 1:02:20 (statement of Rep. 
Christina Hagan). For the larger quote from which this language is drawn, see supra text 
accompanying note 183. 
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and its ultimate ends, and that it fails that test on multiple grounds, is a way of 
giving voice to a judgment that might have been accepted by courts in the Roe-
era, which Roe’s own doctrinal apparatus might have helped to bring to light. 
The wonder in the present tense is, Has the Supreme Court’s abortion 
jurisprudence since Roe, really, in and since Casey, overcome or displaced the 
foundations from which that judgment emerges? Does the Court’s current 
abortion jurisprudence call for another judgment to be made? Or does the 
Court’s present-day abortion jurisprudence have room within it for an 
assessment of the reasonableness of the fit between a State’s reasons for a 
postviability abortion measure and its enacted means of advancing it? 
There is no doubt that the current, Casey-era doctrinal apparatus governing 
postviability abortion regulations does not have as part of its moving pieces any 
“strict scrutiny” requirement, much less an operative “narrow tailoring” rule. 
Indeed, the current, Casey-era doctrinal apparatus governing postviability 
abortion regulations does not very visibly have a robust “fit” requirement to it 
at all. This alone might be thought to be enough to resolve the issue and to say 
that whatever intuitions about H.B. 214’s reasonableness that might have 
obtained in the Roe-era have since been washed away, replaced by nothing more 
than a minimal and loose “rational fit” requirement.  
Before too quickly accepting that conclusion it must be noted that there are 
some indications that the Court’s abortion jurisprudence has not (or has not yet, 
anyway) eliminated the sense that some meaningful constitutional review of 
postviability abortion prohibitions for their reasonableness is still in order. 
The essence of the explanation here focuses on the continued recognition of 
the constitutional abortion right and the way that that right is safeguarded after 
viability, where, in circumstances where an abortion is needed to protect or 
preserve a pregnant woman’s life or health, the right to choose overcomes the 
State’s countervailing interest in protecting and preserving fetal life. In those 
circumstances clearly, and, the idea is, even more generally, given that the 
pregnant woman’s constitutional interests do not totally disappear postviability 
but are only ordinarily outweighed by the State’s opposing interests, State 
restrictions on postviability abortions may properly be examined for their 
constitutional reasonableness precisely as a mechanism by which to weigh and 
accommodate, if not exactly to “balance,”194 what the Court’s abortion doctrine 
frames as the clash of values or interests that the abortion right involves.195  
                                                                                                                     
 194 The quotation marks are meant as a gesture toward the problems of 
incommensurability that constitutional balancing analytics regularly involve. 
 195 To be sure, this point might be limited to cases in which a pregnant woman’s life or 
health, where health is broadly understood, is at stake. That said, the idea in the text is that 
the persistence of the abortion right postviability in cases where a pregnant woman’s life or 
health is at risk can be regarded as a necessary and sufficient predicate for thinking that 
postviability abortion restrictions, including prohibitions, may be subject to a kind of 
constitutional reasonableness review. 
78 OHIO’S “DOWN SYNDROME ABORTION BAN” [Vol. 79 
If correct, then contrary to the widespread belief that any postviability 
abortion regulation or any postviability abortion ban is by definition 
constitutionally acceptable, it might actually be maintained that the State, at 
least where it departs from a postviability abortion regulation that applies 
generally to all pregnancies, should be put to the test of defending a distinctive 
anti-abortion measure of the sort entailed by H.B. 214.196 On what grounds does 
the State single out fetuses that actually or possibly have Down syndrome 
among all others for a unique set of protections like those offered by H.B. 214? 
On what grounds is Down syndrome singled out and differentiated from other 
medical conditions defined as disabilities or other often-overlapping forms of 
social marginalization and inequality that pervade and define social and political 
life?197  
                                                                                                                     
 196 The “greater-includes-the-lesser argument,” which Michael Herz, following Peter 
Westen, among others, “particularly associate[s] with Justice Holmes,” thus does not obtain 
here. Michael Herz, Justice Byron White and the Argument that the Greater Includes the 
Lesser, 1994 BYU L. REV. 227, 239 & nn.47–49 (1994) (citing Peter Westen, The Rueful 
Rhetoric of “Rights,” 33 UCLA L. REV. 977, 1011 n.87 (1986)). Herz notes the association 
of the argument with Holmes, whose dissenting opinion in Western Union Telegraph Co. v. 
Kansas ex rel. Coleman is quoted as offering “one of its purest expressions”: “Even in the 
law the whole generally includes its parts. If the State may prohibit, it may prohibit with the 
privilege of avoiding the prohibition in a certain way.” Id. at 239. (quoting W. Union Tel. 
Co. v. Kansas ex rel. Coleman, 216 U.S. 1, 53 (1910) (Holmes J., dissenting)). A few 
examples of judicial authority for the contrary point of view include and are found in R.A.V. 
v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 384 (1992) (“[T]he government may proscribe libel; but it 
may not make the further content discrimination of proscribing only libel critical of the 
government.”); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 184–86, 194, 196 (1964) (striking 
down a Florida law that barred interracial, nonmarital cohabitation, without casting doubt on 
the State’s general ability to regulate nonmarital intimacies, including cohabitation); 
Cleveland Automobile Co. v. United States, 70 F.2d 365, 368 (6th Cir. 1934) (noting that 
“the greater does not include the lesser”); and Joseph Joseph & Bros. Co. v. United States, 
71 F.2d 389, 391 (6th Cir. 1934) (noting the same, and quoting Cleveland Automobile Co. v. 
United States). Borrowing from Herz, the situation at hand is one of those instances in which 
“the parts do not necessarily share the characteristics of the whole. . . . [T]he greater may not 
include the lesser because exercise of the ‘lesser’ power implicates constitutional 
considerations not present in the exercise of the ‘greater’ power.” Herz, supra, at 243. 
 197 The argument being framed in the text could, of course, also be framed directly in 
equal protection terms, as a question about the reasonable grounds of difference between 
fetuses with or possibly having Down syndrome and all others in the context of abortion 
rights. H.B. 214 would fail equal protection scrutiny if understood as a sex-based regulation 
and subject to the conditions described in United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 519, 533 
(1996), but even if not, the measure, as one that implicates substantive-due-process-based 
abortion rights, might prompt an equal protection inquiry along the following lines. On what 
basis are fetuses with or possibly having Down syndrome being selected out by the State 
from other fetuses with other disabilities or other markers of social hierarchy and inequality? 
As noted elsewhere, see supra notes 180–85 and accompanying text, this question received 
some airing as H.B. 214 worked its way through the Ohio legislature. In one of the more 
curious turns during legislative deliberations, testimony by Mike Gonidakis, President of 
Ohio Right to Life, speaking in favor of H.B. 214, raised, although it did not stop thoroughly 
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Needless to say, the pressures of justification that bear upon the State would 
not obtain if postviability abortion regulations were regulations of an ordinary 
matter of social or economic life, which might technically be how anti-abortion 
measures were understood if the entirety of the Supreme Court’s abortion 
jurisprudence back to Roe were to be overturned. Under those circumstances, 
abortion prohibitions at any point during pregnancy or at any point of fetal 
development might be subject to no more than “ordinary” or “traditional” 
rational basis review, the tremendous deference of which would make it easy 
for the State to justify taking only the distinctive “first step” that H.B. 214 takes, 
                                                                                                                     
to consider, the similar situatedness of fetuses with (or likely or only perhaps believed 
possibly to be with) Down syndrome and fetuses that “are” or “might be gay”:  
I’ll leave with this. And, it’s probably controversial, but, I’m going to say it nonetheless. 
A moment ago, I said that it’s just a matter of time before we find the autism gene. And, 
I suspect, just being a lawyer, but I suspect at some point . . . [you] know, I have many 
gay friends and they all tell me it’s not a lifestyle, it’s not a choice or a decision they 
made when they were fifteen. They were born gay. So, at some point the gay gene is 
going to be found. And, there’s going to be proof that yes, you’re born gay or you’re 
born straight. I suspect that’s what will happen. . . . So what happens when Betty 
Buckeye and her husband, Billy Buckeye, go to the hospital or go to the doctor’s office 
and the doctor walks in and says, “Congratulations, your child does not have Down’s 
Syndrome. We tested. Your child does not have autism. We tested. Oh, but you know, 
hey, congratulations, by the way, your child has the gay gene and your son or daughter 
has a high propensity for being gay.” What happens when Betty Buckeye says, “Well, 
I’m going to have an abortion because I don’t want to have a gay child.” Is that a hate 
crime? Is that offensive? I bring this out because as we continue to go down the line this 
is where we’re going unless we draw a line in the sand now. 
Ohio Senate, 132d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., Hearing on S. 154 Before the S. Health, Human 
Services and Medicaid Committee: 12-12-2017, OHIO CHANNEL, at 00:51:38 (Ohio 2017–
2018) (statement of Michael Gonidakis, President, Ohio Right to Life). (For some useful 
historical and conceptual context of this line of thinking as seen from a pro-gay point of 
view, consider Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of 
the Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503, 521–26 (1994) (offering thoughts 
about genetic arguments explaining homosexuality from a pro-gay “constructivist” 
perspective).) If the situation of sexual minorities is readily comparable to the situation of 
people with Down syndrome as in this defense of H.B. 214, why does the measure not also 
treat sexual orientation or identity as another prohibited grounds upon which a pregnant 
woman may not base her decision to end an unwanted pregnancy? The answer, viewed very 
strictly, cannot be because the so-called “gay gene” has not yet been “found,” id., and that it 
thus cannot be tested for. H.B. 214, after all, includes among its list of prohibited reasons the 
mere belief that a fetus may have Down syndrome. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.10(B)(3) 
(West, Westlaw through File 51 of 132d Gen. Assemb. (2017–2018)) (prohibiting abortions 
for “[a]ny other reason [that the woman has or might have] to believe that an unborn child 
has Down syndrome.”). Recognizing that there are different ways to capture the problematics 
of the Down syndrome abortion ban, those circling around matters of equality are, as the text 
seeks to note, legible from within—and can thus be addressed within—the Supreme Court’s 
abortion rights jurisprudence and the range of values that it reflects. 
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with additional steps to protect other forms of prenatal life defined by disability 
or other sorts of inequality, to come later, if at all.198 
No small aside here: The Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence has 
already noted that previability abortion regulations that impose no undue burden 
are subject only to a minimal and deferential form of judicial review,199 and this 
approach to abortion regulations could certainly as a matter of doctrine be 
extended to laws governing postviability abortion regulations. Practically, 
however, the only way for a court to conclude that conventional rational basis 
review, with all its deference to legislative judgments, is the singular standard 
for measuring all postviability abortion regulations is to take the position that a 
pregnant woman’s constitutional right to abortion counts for naught after the 
fetus she is carrying becomes viable. 
Doctrinally, that rule has not (yet) been announced. Nor could it readily be 
squared with the continuing right that pregnant women, even in and after Casey, 
possess after viability, which guarantees that the State may not stop her from 
getting an abortion needed to safeguard her life or health. That being the case, 
it stands to reason that in the Casey-era in which we still live, there must still be 
some meaningful room left for the constitutional examination of the State’s 
justifications for outlawing abortion both before . . . and (here is the key point 
being made) after viability.200 Minimally, with respect to H.B. 214, the State’s 
reasons for protecting fetuses with or that may have Down syndrome must be 
reasonably related to the legislation’s real ends. But, for the various reasons 
already elaborated, there are multiple paths to the singular conclusion that H.B. 
214 is not a measure that is reasonably related to its prohibitory ends.201 
                                                                                                                     
 198 See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955); cf. supra 
text accompanying note 185. 
 199 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 158 (2007) (“Where it has a rational 
basis to act, and it does not impose an undue burden, the State may use its regulatory power 
to bar certain procedures and substitute others, all in furtherance of its legitimate interests in 
regulating the medical profession in order to promote respect for life, including life of the 
unborn.”); id. (noting the legitimacy of ethics or morality as a basis for restricting abortion 
procedure that did not impose an “undue burden” on a pregnant woman’s right to choose). 
 200 Obviously, just how searching an examination for the reasonableness of means–end 
fit will be will vary depending on when it occurs during the course of pregnancy in light of 
fetal development. Postviability abortion prohibitions will certainly come in for less 
searching constitutional scrutiny, and, correspondingly, receive considerably more judicial 
deference than their previability counterparts, which are presently subject to the demands of 
the undue burden test with its balancing of interests. There is no neat algorithm to be found 
for how to calibrate these different types of “reasonableness” review.  
 201 There is a way to read Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt as affirming or 
reaffirming a kind of “reality principle” in the Court’s current abortion rights jurisprudence. 
According to this reality principle, courts should look carefully not simply “at” but also 
“through” the proffered justifications for anti-abortion rules to see what their real, underlying 
purposes are. Those real purposes should then serve as the predicate for judicial analysis. In 
Whole Woman’s Health, the Supreme Court used the benefits–burdens analysis to reach the 
conclusion that the measures involved in the case were not really about advancing pregnant 
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To see the various ways to this conclusion is already to understand a 
powerful asymmetry in our federal constitutional system. In our constitutional 
regime, the State must stand ready to give at least a meaningful and reasonable 
account of itself and the reasons for its governance rules where those rules 
implicate a constitutionally protected right like the right to terminate an 
unwanted pregnancy through abortion. By contrast, women who are pregnant 
and who have constitutionally protected interests in making reproductive 
decisions for themselves and their futures need not account to the State for their 
reasons for exercising the rights they are constitutionally guaranteed.202  
This imbalance in accountability is not an ineluctable fact. It could change, 
and there are arguments, including some arguments behind some support for 
H.B. 214, suggesting that the situation should change. For now, though, this is 
a description of a feature of our constitutional system and its underlying values 
as they exist at this place and at this moment in time. It is a way of noticing a 
fact about our constitutional system that has existed for long enough to 
constitute an aspect of the traditions of our constitutional, rule-of-law regime.203 
At the same time, it marks some of the deeper structural stakes of a rule of 
constitutional law upholding H.B. 214. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Having come this far, it is hopefully clear that and why H.B. 214 is 
inconsistent with the existing constitutional rules governing abortion rights both 
previability and postviability, and why a court reviewing the measure for its 
constitutionality could properly conclude it must be struck down. 
But—if a point of personal privilege is in order—there is one final 
observation in relation to H.B. 214 to share.  
                                                                                                                     
women’s health. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016). In the 
case of H.B. 214, the reality principle, for reasons that have already been discussed in the 
text, might call the question on whether H.B. 214 is really, finally, about fetuses with Down 
syndrome or about something else, whether the protection or preservation of the life of the 
unborn, or, in more doctrine-focused terms, the continuing validity of Roe v. Wade. See supra 
notes 168, 193 and accompanying text (discussing, from different perspectives, what the 
actual purposes of H.B. 214 might look like in light of a reasonable means–end fit analysis). 
 202 This locution takes account of the prospect that postviability abortion decisions in 
individual cases involving a pregnant woman’s life or health might themselves be seen as 
decisional abortion permissions that are constitutionally allowed. Within the context of the 
right to choose that is constitutionally safeguarded both before and (to the extent it is 
safeguarded) after viability, the State may not itself impose a decisional abortion ban that 
further constricts a pregnant woman’s choice. 
 203 Richard Primus, Rulebooks, Playgrounds, and Endgames: A Constitutional Analysis 
of the Calabresi-Hirji Judgeship Proposal, HARV. L. REV.: BLOG (Nov. 24, 2017), 
https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/rulebooks-playgrounds-and-endgames-a-constitutional-analysis-
of-the-calabresi-hirji-judgeship-proposal/ [https://perma.cc/HZ4J-6T9X] (discussing big “C” 
Constitutionalism and its relation to little “c” constitutionalism in the context of a proposal 
for reforms to the federal judiciary).  
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To put it mildly, H.B. 214 is a contentious measure that has already 
engendered intense disagreement. As surely as some find H.B. 214 appealing as 
a righteous rule of law that furthers the protections that the State should offer to 
human life from the moment of conception on, others (including some in the 
first group) find it appealing because it seems to them to declare and vindicate 
the equal dignity and respect that those who live life or who might live life with 
Down syndrome are unquestionably entitled to. At the same time, as surely, 
H.B. 214 has been roundly condemned by many who see it not only as an 
aggressive but also an unlawful attempt to cut short the rights of women that 
additionally treats the lives and lived realities that those with Down syndrome 
experience as a political device to advance a project that is ultimately not about 
them and their equal dignity and worth or their actual needs for survival and 
flourishing. For many of its critics, H.B. 214 is a violation—not a validation—
of commitments to equal dignity and respect for all the members of our shared 
political communities, including the most vulnerable among us. 
There is a great deal to be said about these opposing perspectives, but past 
them is a different point of view. Leaving H.B. 214’s constitutionality—or 
unconstitutionality—aside, along with whatever there is to be said about its 
truthful and pure or cynical and impure motivations, H.B. 214 offers a powerful 
reminder with social and political resonance and implications. Nobody who 
looks attentively and seriously across the current social and political landscape 
can possibly think that our communities and the State do enough for those who 
live lives affected by Down syndrome. Nor, for that matter, that our 
communities and the State do enough for those who live lives affected by other 
types of disabilities, much less that even larger group of individuals who live 
lives marked by other forms—often intersecting forms—of social inequality. 
Speaking for myself, H.B. 214 has been a call, finally, not only or even 
primarily to come to terms with the questions it raises as a matter of federal 
constitutional law focusing on the Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence. 
Perhaps owing something to the spirit that animates it, or perhaps it is something 
else, H.B. 214 is a text that has the capacity to prick a conscience. 
Have I done as much as I might to work to understand the lives and the 
needs of those who live life defined in part by Down syndrome, by differing 
abilities, and by other, often intersecting, social inequalities? Have I done as 
much as I might to ensure that the abundant blessings available in our shared 
political communities are enjoyed equally, fairly, and justly, by all of them? 
What more is there that I might try to do to empower my friends and neighbors 
and fellow citizens in these groups as they travel on their own paths, and we all 
together on ours? Candidly, H.B. 214, obviously not intended for these 
purposes, has anyway reminded me of how I have yet to live up to my own 
ideals of and for our shared social and political life.  
Considering that, I wonder: Is this strictly a personal truth? 
